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Mathematics is the DNA of all that matters.
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Abstract
The host of a game presents two indistinguishable envelopes to an agent. One
of the envelopes is randomly selected and allocated to the agent. The agent
is informed that the monetary content of one of the envelopes is twice that
of the other. The dilemma is under which conditions it would be beneficial
to switch the allocated envelope for the complementary one. The objective of
his or her envelope-switching strategy is to determine the benefit of switch-
ing the allocated envelope and its content for the expected content of the
complementary envelope.
The agent, upon revealing the content of the allocated envelope, must consider
the events that are likely to have taken place as a result of the host’s activ-
ities. The preceding approach is in stark contrast to considering the agent’s
reasoning for a particular outcome that seeks to derive a strategy based on
the relative contents of the presented envelopes. However, it is the former
reasoning that seeks to identify what the initial amounts could have been,
as a result of the observed amount, that facilitates the identification of an
appropriate switching strategy.
Knowledge of the content and allocation process is essential for the agent
to derive a successful switching strategy, as is the distribution function from
which the host sampled the initial amount that is assigned to the first enve-
lope.
For every play of the game, once the agent is afforded the opportunity of sight-
ing the content of the randomly allocated envelope, he or she can determine
the expected benefit of switching.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
. . . statistical information on frequencies within a large, repetitive class of events is
strictly irrelevant to a decision whose outcome depends on a single trial.
— Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms (Ellsberg 1961:2)
The two-envelope problem associated with the game of switching envelopes, which is
responsible for the so-called “two-envelope paradox”, relies on the choices that confront
an agent who must derive a strategy for retaining the randomly allocated envelope or
switching envelopes and accepting the complementary envelope.
The simplicity of the game belies the unprecedented amount of scholarly interest and
attention it has garnered since first considered by Kraitchik (1942:p133). A number of
papers cite both the origination of the problem and the related paradox in a variant of
the “necktie” problem first posed by Kraitchik (1942:p133). The game has since mutated
into the current two-envelope problem, which has enjoyed notoriety because of its para-
doxical interpretation in that it is alleged that it is always beneficial to switch envelopes
irrespective of the content.
The “two-envelope paradox”, which has been the cause of much debate and consternation
within the academic fraternity, centres on the strategy of an agent (player of the game)
and rarely the related activities of the host (of the game).
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While the two-envelope problem that has given rise to the paradox is reasonably simple
in its presentation, its resolution and explanation have been somewhat elusive and, in
some cases, unconvincing because most authors have failed to formulate the problem
correctly. What is important, however, is that the agent can use the information he or
she possesses in order to adopt a game strategy that allows him or her to determine
the expected content of the complementary envelope upon sighting the content of the
allocated envelope.
The objective of any strategy is to identify the benefit of switching the randomly allo-
cated envelope and its observed contents for the expected content of the complementary
envelope. It is very tempting to claim that the relative and therefore average content of
the complementary envelope must be greater than the observed amount in the randomly
allocated envelope for switching to take place.
Of the two primed envelopes, one is randomly selected and allocated to the agent. The
agent, who has been informed that the content of one of the envelopes is twice that of the
other, is then given the option of retaining the allocated envelope or switching envelopes
in order to secure the envelope that contains the larger amount.
In addition to being informed that the content of one of the envelopes is twice the con-
tent of the other, the agent must also consider whether having sight of the content of
the allocated envelope is relevant. If sighting the content is deemed to be significant,
then it becomes important to determine what other information would assist the agent
in identifying the game strategy that can realise the greatest expected benefit for any ob-
served amount in the allocated envelope. Although “twice the other” seems to be a simple
statement, this result can derive from halving, doubling, or a combination of halving and
doubling, depending on the content and allocation process.
In most previous articles, the authors assume that the agent will reason that if the
randomly allocated envelope is observed to contain an amount of money, then the com-
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plementary envelope must contain either half or double that amount, each with an equal
likelihood. However, it is not the content of the complementary envelope that is relevant.
It will be realised that it is the content of the first envelope and the consequent content
of the second envelope that are directly related to the observed amount in the allocated
envelope. And, by inference, indirectly the content of the complementary envelope is
considered relevant, when in reality it is not.
1.1 Information
The host of the game is responsible for assigning amounts of money, according to a
certain content and allocation process, to each of the two envelopes. How these amounts
are identified and assigned to the envelopes is explained in the content and allocation
process of the game. The money assigned to the first envelope is a randomly determined
amount, whereas the second amount is dependent upon the amount assigned to the first
envelope.
In the random allocation of these indistinguishable envelopes, the agent receives one of
the two envelopes.
Newcomers to the two-envelope problem may be forgiven for an initial response that has
been exhaustively researched and, depending on the objective of the study in question,
justified. In most instances, such examinations have ignored the activities of the host —
the identification of the initial amount that is to be assigned to the first envelope and the
subsequent amount assigned to the second envelope — for a specific play of the game,
with the presented envelopes and their contents treated as the only relevant data for the
agent. Indeed, it has been assumed that the outcomes of the host’s activities for each
play of the game are the only factors deemed to be relevant for solving the problem.
If the agent considers the problem from a probabilistic perspective, it soon becomes
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apparent that the activities of the host — for all related outcomes — directly influences
the agent’s potential strategy. It also becomes clear that the observed amount may be
related to the activities of the host on an expected basis and that there is an indirect
relationship between the amounts outside of the immediately obvious linkage. Specifically,
what the agent reveals in the allocated envelope does define the possible activities of
the host (who was responsible for the initial amount assigned to the first envelope and
consequent amount assigned to the second envelope).
This problem can be considered to be a two-stage experiment. The first stage is associated
with the activities of the host, while the second stage is associated with the activities of
the agent. Because these two stages are subtly independent, the agent must consider the
following five content and allocation possibilities (one of which will have been adopted
by the host) in order to derive his or her switching strategy.
1.1.1 Content and allocation
The initial amount is determined by the host who randomly samples from an appropriate
cumulative distribution function and assigns the amount to the first envelope. Thereafter,
the second amount is derived according to one of the following five possibilities:
Possibility 1. The host may prime the second envelope, by halving or doubling the initial
amount of money, and assigning the resultant amount to the second envelope. He or she
then randomly selects one of the envelopes and allocates it to the agent for consideration;
Possibility 2. The host may prime the second envelope, by doubling the content of the
first. He or she then randomly allocates one of the envelopes to the agent for consideration;
Possibility 3. The host may prime the second envelope, by halving the content of the first.
He or she then randomly allocates one of the envelopes to the agent for consideration;
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While it is true that the content of the complementary envelope is either half or dou-
ble the content of the randomly allocated envelope, it is true that the expected benefit
of switching envelopes is the difference between the expectation of the content of the
complementary envelope and the observed content of the allocated envelope.
In order to identify an appropriate switching strategy, it is thus relevant for the agent to
consider what the host may have assigned initially to the first envelope and subsequently
to the second envelope. The expected benefit of switching, which is a function of the
amount observed by the agent, is associated with the host having assigned either half the
amount, the equivalent amount, or twice the observed amount to the first envelope. And,
the content of the second envelope is now considered as a function of the content of the
first envelope. This, allocation of the content to the first and envelopes is not the end of
the story. The envelopes are indistinguishable and subject to a random allocation that
will see different combinations that ultimately generate the allocated and complementary
envelopes. Since the host is randomly selecting an initial amount from an arbitrary
distribution function it is distinctly possible that each of the amounts – half, equivalent,
or double – will each occur with a different probability. Moreover, it is accepted that
one of the indistinguishable envelopes is randomly allocated to the agent and that the
complementary envelope will be considered to be preferred or not upon sighting the
content of the allocated envelope, when permitted.
It is the random allocation of the envelopes that ensures that the allocated envelope
contains a fixed amount and that the complementary envelope will contain either half
or double the content of the allocated envelope. That the content of the complementary
envelope contains half or double that of the allocated envelope agrees with the relative
explanation that is so often quoted.
Possibility 4. The host may allocate the first envelope to the agent and then prime the
second envelope by either halving or doubling the content of the first; or
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Possibility 5. The host may retain the first envelope. The second envelope will then
be primed by either halving or doubling the content of the first envelope. This second
envelope is then allocated to the agent.
The traditional approach to solving the two-envelope problem has only considered the
content Y of the allocated and the content Z of the complementary envelope. For any play
of the game it will be taken that the contents of the envelopes remain unchanged. With
this condition it must be accepted that, irrespective of the content and allocation process,
that the relative content of the complementary envelope is either twice or half that of
allocated envelope. For any specific play of the game (single trial) the allocated envelope
may contain the larger amount Y = 2x and the complementary envelope Z = x, and as
a result Z = Y/2. Alternatively, if the allocated envelope contains the smaller amount,
then Y = x and Z = 2x, and as a result Z = 2Y . Which transformation should be applied
is clearly an issue that cannot be ignored. In the absence of information the agent can
conclude that the host primed the envelopes with the amounts X1 = y and X
′
1 = 2y, if the
“doubling-only” process was adopted. Therefore, as a result of the random allocation, the
agent may observe Y = y and consequently conclude that the complementary envelope
contains Z = 2y or the agent may observe Y = 2y and consequently conclude that the
complementary envelope contains Z = y. Since these outcomes are equally likely – due
to symmetry – the agent should be indifferent to switching envelopes or not.
It would be more appropriate to take the content of the allocated envelope Y = y as fixed
and to then consider the possible values that the complementary envelope Z may contain
as a result of the content and allocation process. While it is acknowledged that the
relative content of the complementary envelope Z can be either y/2 or 2y, these possible
values should only be considered as a result of the content and allocation process.
The amount in the complementary envelope is assumed to be associated with the host
generating an amount X1 = y and does not recognise that the amount Y = y can only
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be observed as a result of the host’s activities associated with x1 ∈ {y/2; y; 2y}. Further,
the assertion that Y = y is only possible for X1 = 2y or X1 = y/2 does not consider
the relationship between the observed Y = y and X1 and states that this relationship is
distribution free by having originated from the host generating X1 = 2x1 or X1 = x1/2.
The realisation that X1 = 2y and X1 = y/2 are just as relevant as X1 = y for the
derivation of the expected benefit B is discussed in Chapter 4, where the alternative
strategies associated with the content and allocation process are derived. The evolution
of the two-envelope problem and the consequent paradox is then discussed in Chapter 6.
The way in which the problem is posed lends itself to assumptions about the reasoning
of the agent. That the agent is assumed to reason in a particular way is not necessarily
correct. However, it does seem to be the approach followed by previous authors (Sobel
1994).
1.1.2 The rules of the game
While little or no attention has been paid to how the activities of the host influences
the process of assigning the amounts to the envelopes and the subsequent allocation of
the envelopes, it is important for the agent to know about these. This information must
include the distribution function from which the host sampled the initial amount, while
the agent must also have sight of the content of the allocated envelope.
The rules of the game for the informed agent are thus as follows:
Rule 1. The agent will have sight of the contents in the allocated envelope;
Rule 2. The agent will be informed about the content and allocation strategy;
Rule 3. The agent will be informed about the process of amount identification;
Rule 4. The agent will be informed about the distribution function from which the host
sampled the initial amount. If the agent is not informed about the distribution function
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from which the initial amount is generated, the agent may assume a prior distribution. In
addition, subsequent to each play of the game, the agent may refine the prior distribution
to enhance the predictive ability in the successive play of the game. Irrespective of whether
the agent has assumed or derived such a prior distribution or not, the density function
under consideration for each play of the game will be taken as given;
Rule 5. The agent will be informed of the bounds (if they exist) for the amounts that can
be assigned to the envelopes. While it is acknowledged that the paradox does not exist in
the presence of a defined upper bound this still does not address a playing strategy.
The relevance of each of these rules is fundamental for solving the two-envelope problem.
1.2 Expectation
The scholarly interest that the two-envelope paradox has generated is based on its simple
presentation. But, it is the formulation of the problem (where the absence of information
and as a result assumptions) that has perpetuated the assertion of the paradox.
The traditional explanation of the paradox is founded on the premise that the outcome of
any game is the difference between what is expected and what is observed. In particular,
what is expected is taken as the average of two amounts, namely (i) double the observed
amount and (ii) half the observed amount.
As described earlier, the host of the two-envelope game prepares two indistinguishable
envelopes by assigning amounts of money to each. The agent is randomly allocated one
of the envelopes. Before any interaction with the envelopes, the agent is informed that
the amount of money in one envelope is twice the amount in the other. The agent is then
asked whether in the absence of sighting the content, the complementary envelope would
be preferred.
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However, nothing has been said about sighting the content. Herein, it is shown that in
the absence of the distribution function from which the host identified the initial amount,
there is no benefit for the agent to switching envelopes. It is only once the density function
is considered that the agent can derive a switching strategy.
For many the approach is associated with the host will double the initial amount and
assign this to the second envelope. After randomly allocating one of the indistinguishable
envelopes to the agent, the agent can conclude that the envelope will contain an amount
that could be the larger or the smaller. If the agent is informed that the host has adopted
a doubling only process, then the agent can safely assume that if the envelope contains
the larger amount then the initial amount assigned to the first envelope would have
been the smaller amount — a relative amount that is also stated as half the amount
in the allocated envelope. The probability of the host generating this smaller amount
would have been identified from the distribution function chosen by the host, and this
smaller amount would have been doubled, hence the larger amount. Alternatively, if the
envelope contains the smaller amount then the agent can conclude that the initial amount
was assigned to the first envelope and that the larger (double the smaller) was assigned
to the second envelope — a relative amount that is also stated as twice the amount in
the allocated envelope. The complementary envelope does, as noted by many, contain
either half or double the amount in the allocated envelope. The content of the allocated
envelope is fixed. Applying a probability to the respective initial amounts does yield the
expected outcome and by subtracting the amount contained in the allocated envelope the
expected benefit of switching can be derived.
1.3 A strategy or a paradox
Although two envelopes are under consideration in every play of the game, only the con-
tent of the randomly allocated envelope is relevant once its content has been revealed for
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any play. The content of the complementary envelope is irrelevant for the purposes of
deriving a strategy unless the agent has not been given information of the prior distribu-
tion function from which the host is sampling (in which case the content of the second
envelope can be utilised for updating the prior distribution). Hence, the agent can collate
the outcomes for each play of the game in order to monitor the overall performance of
the adopted strategy.
The traditional posing of the problem has led to it being improperly formulated and
consequently incorrectly solve (Silver 1994). This ill-stated problem, in the absence of
any assumption and information, together with the failure to re-formulate the problem
correctly is the reason for the plethora of papers that continue to sustain the myth of the
paradox (Loredo 2004).
The argument, for the envelopes containing X1 and X
′
1, in the absence of sighting the
content, is that if the agent had been randomly allocated the envelope that contained
the amount Y = X1 then the benefit B of switching would be the difference between
X ′1−X1. Alternatively, if the allocated envelope contained the amount Y = X ′1, then the
benefit B of switching would be the difference between X1−X ′1. Each of the envelopes is
equally likely to be allocated to the agent. The agent may assume that since the contents
are fixed at the time of selection, they remain unchanged during the process; therefore,
it is irrelevant whether he or she chooses to switch or not.
The alternative argument, in the absence of sighting the content, runs as follows. The
complementary envelope contains either half or double the amount in the randomly al-
located envelope for the following reason. If the content of the allocated envelope were
observed to be Y , then the complementary envelope would be either Z = 2Y and the
benefit of switching would be B = Z − Y = Y . Alternatively, if the complementary en-
velope were Z = Y/2, then the benefit of switching would be B = Z − Y = −Y/2. Since
each of these outcomes is equally likely, the amount you stand to gain is greater then the
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amount that you will lose, and the agent should switch. But, herein lies the paradox.
For if the complementary envelope is treated as the randomly allocated envelope then
the same reasoning applies.
It is merely coincidental that without considering the activities of the host and the con-
sequent statistical events, the conclusions of many papers concur fortuitously with the
findings presented in the subsequent chapters of the present paper.
In order for the agent of the two-envelope game to identify an envelope switching strat-
egy, he or she must be informed of the host’s activities, which are associated with the
identification of the initial amount assigned to the first envelope.
It is demonstrated herein that once the agent has been informed about the distribution
function, and upon sighting the content of the allocated envelope, he or she can derive
and apply a suitable strategy to identify the expected benefit of switching. Consequently,
the agent can decide whether to switch given the available information. Examples of
different density functions are presented in Chapter 5.
1.4 Summary
The agent has to identify a game strategy that will realise the greatest expected benefit for
each play of the game, either by retaining the randomly allocated envelope and its contents
or by switching envelopes and accepting the content of the complementary envelope. The
difference between the expected content of the complementary envelope and the observed
content of the randomly allocated envelope is then the expected benefit of switching.
In the presence of the density function of the associated events for the observed amount, a
benefit can be identified from switching the allocated envelope for the expected content of
the complementary envelope. It is not the content of the complementary envelope, for any
single trial, that dictates the strategy. It is the expected content of the complementary
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envelope, for which the content of the allocated envelope is always noted to be Y = y, that
generates the necessary switching strategy. The expected content of the complementary
envelope is directly related to the initial amount assigned to the first envelope.
The agent, however, in revealing the content of the randomly assigned envelope, no longer
needs to be concerned with the content of the complementary envelope. The sighted
content is the means whereby the expected content of the complementary envelope is
derived.
When the agent is not informed about the density function, he or she can use the informa-
tion that each play of the game presents in order to refine an assumed prior distribution,
which would be useful in subsequent plays of the game. Therefore, the approach adopted
throughout this paper relies on the fact that a density function, whether derived or pro-
vided, is given.
In deriving his or her strategy, the agent considers the content of the randomly allocated
envelope and the expected content of its complement. The expected difference between
the contents of the former and the latter expresses the benefit to be realised should the
agent decide to make this switch.
Thus, the agent assesses the available information associated with the content and allo-
cation processes before adopting his or her chosen strategy.
Information on the activities associated with the host’s generating of the game is essential
for the agent to identify an appropriate and optimal playing strategy. Further, the agent
is assumed to be risk-neutral and rational.
In summary, this research shows that, in the presence of information, it is possible for
the agent to determine a switching strategy that can identify the expected benefit of
switching envelopes for any observed amount in the randomly allocated envelope. Even
after the play, the gained knowledge of the content of the envelopes has no bearing on
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successive plays of the game if the agent is informed about the distribution function from
which the host sampled the initial amount that was assigned to the first envelope.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
You know that envelope A contains a randomly determined sum of money, and
envelope B contains, as a consequence of the flip of a fair coin, either half or twice
that sum. And you know that one of these envelopes, randomly selected, has been
given to you.
Suppose you are a risk-neutral money seeker who can choose between the money
contained in the envelope that has been given to you and the money in the other
envelope. Which do you prefer, or are you indifferent?
Suppose that you open your envelope. Now that you know exactly how much money
is in it, which do you prefer, this money, or the money in the other envelope?
— Two Envelopes (Sobel 1994:p1)
The above-described dilemma posed by Sobel (1994:p1) is typical of the majority of papers
that discuss the two-envelope problem, which as noted in Chapter 1, has engendered a
great deal of research interest and debate. The challenge it has presented to many and the
consequent explanations by authors have not necessarily produced a convincing argument
to substantiate or refute the two-envelope paradox, however.
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A story be told about an interesting paradox? But, perhaps even more interesting is
the story that can be told of the many attempts to resolve an otherwise simple problem
and thereby the paradox. That the paradox has attracted so much interest from such
a diverse array of authors is a testament to the intrigue surrounding the problem and
possibly academic prowess.
It is true that the amount of money in one envelope is twice that in the other envelope.
But what is the implication of this statement that would seem to be quoted in nearly
every publication. What is the true meaning of this statement and how can the other
envelope always contain a greater expected amount of money regardless of which envelope
you choose?
And it can be said that the observed amount is possibly the smaller or the larger of the
content of the two envelopes. It can also be said that the content of the one envelope is
twice the other, or half the other. These innocent statements only obfuscate what is the
essential for the resolution of this problem.
What is necessary is that the reader recognises the provided information and then pro-
ceeds to understand the activities of the host of the game. In so doing, the agent will come
to realise what additional information would make it essential for a winning strategy.
That the problem is ill-posed has been recognised by Loredo (2004:p2) and a re-formulation
is necessary to facilitate the derivation of an appropriate switching strategy.
The alert reader will note the lack of consistency and the many attempts from diverse
disciplines of those that have sought to settle the issue. We should heed the warning by
Chihara (1995:p5) of the the subtle nature of the problem and exercise caution. Many are
tempted to resolve the two-envelope problem through all manner of means when relying
on increasingly complex arguments and may miss the point (Rawling 1994:p97).
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2.1 Posing the problem
The variants, of which this version by Sobel (1994:p1) is but one, are essentially all the
same. This is simply a mathematical problem that is not well-posed and over time many
authors have recognised this and consequently re-formulated the problem and made it
more tractable (Silver 1994:p19).
The presentation of the two-envelope problem rarely informs the agent about the content
and allocation process that is adopted by the host. There is also some degree of confu-
sion about the distinct difference between the amounts assigned to the first and second
envelopes and what is contained in the allocated and complementary envelopes (Rawling
1994:p98).
Recent papers have referred to the density function from which the host selects the initial
amount of money. If the agent is informed about this density function and understands
the content and allocation process adopted by the host, then he or she can identify a
strategy, provided that the content of the allocated envelope is sighted before deciding to
switch envelopes or not.
Most authors in their exploration of the problem consider the amount of money in the al-
located envelope and conclude that the amount in the complementary envelope is directly
derivable from this sighted amount.
The real issue is being able to identify the amounts in the first and second envelopes
that would have yielded the observed amount in the allocated envelope. It is the initial
amount assigned to the first envelope and the consequent assigning of another amount to
the second envelope followed by the random allocation of the indistinguishable envelopes
that determines what the agent reveals in the allocated envelope.
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2.1.1 The formulation
While, not being permitted to sight the content may be taken as information, it does
render the decision to switch or not irrelevant and consequently the agent should be
indifferent.
The realisation that in the absence of sighting the content of the allocated envelope there
can be no benefit to switching the envelopes has been thoroughly reported by Loredo
(2004:p2). But, it is the alternative situation, when the agent is afforded the opportunity
of sighting the content of the allocated envelope that continues to frustrate and entertain
(Broome 1995; Clark and Shackel 2000).
Once the host informs the agent of the content and allocation process, then the agent
can derive a strategy. In the instance where the host withholds the information of the
distribution function from which the initial amount would have been identified, then the
agent can in the long run estimate and refine the prior distribution subsequent to each
play of the game. As a result of this, it will be taken that the agent is informed of the
distribution function. Strategies, in instances of the agent being informed, are readily
identified by (Christensen and Utts 1992:p275), and (Brams and Kilgour 1995; Broome
1995; Bruss and Ruschendorf 2000; Castell and Batens 1994; Scott and Scott 1997).
It is not the expectation of the density function that is in question but the existence of the
sub-σ-algebra induced by the observed amount (Ash 1972:p254). Once this is accepted,
then the expected benefit of switching is the conditional expectation of the sub-σ-algebra
induced by the observed amount. Any question of infinities can immediately be dismissed,
and any concerns about the measures associated with contentious distribution functions
are no longer valid (Nalebuff 1989:p176), (Rawling 1994:p98).
The concept of a sub-σ-algebra ensures that the observed amount in the allocated enve-
lope, also referred by Rawling (1994:p100), Jeffrey (1986:p8), and McGrew et al. (1997)
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as a rigid designator, will allow the narrowing of the distance between opinions. Finally
the consensus – albeit from different disciplines – will add credence to the overwhelming
evidence refuting the existence of the paradox (Rawling 1994:p101).
2.1.2 The content
What is assigned to the first and second envelope must be distinguished from what is in
the allocated and complementary envelopes.
Most resort to describing the problem as consisting of two envelopes to which have been
assigned sums of money. In the problem posed by Sobel (1994:p1) above, the amount
assigned to the second envelope is either half or double the amount assigned to the first.
This content and allocation process is also considered by Cargile (1992:p212), Nalebuff
(1989), Bruss (1996), Rawling (1994:p97). By contrast Broome (1995) considers only that
the amount assigned to the second envelope is double the amount assigned to the first
envelope. While Brams and Kilgour (1995) assign an amount to the second envelope that
is half the amount assigned to the first envelope. These different processes, of content
and allocation, for the two-envelope problem yield distinctly different strategies, as will
be demonstrated in Chapter 4.
The allocation strategy will be discussed in Chapter 3.
What process is responsible for observing an amount and then concluding that the other
is half or double, is rarely considered. It is routinely taken that the relevant information
is immediately before the agent and is all that is necessary to justify an appropriate
strategy. Although the agent observes an amount of money, the amount observed is not
what the host may have assigned to the first envelope. And this realisation makes it
necessary for the agent to know the distribution function from which the initial amount
was sampled (Loredo 2004:p5) . For example, in the instance of the “doubling-only”
process, for the agent to observe a particular amount of money, it is possible that the
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host may have sampled an initial amount that is exactly what the agent observes and
the complementary envelope then contains double the observed amount. Or, the initial
amount could have been half the amount observed and as a result of the “doubling-
only” process the amount assigned to the second envelope is revealed as the content of
the allocated envelope. This later alternative ensures that the complementary envelope
contains half the the amount in the allocated envelope.
What matters is the content and allocation process and what the agent observes in the
allocated envelope. With this in mind, the content of the complementary envelope at the
time of play, is irrelevant to the agent.
The approach in this paper follows the discussion by Katz and Olin (2007:p914) in which
they recognise that the amounts of money assigned to the envelopes, according to the con-
tent and allocation process, are relevant for the agent to derive an appropriate switching
strategy.
We turn, now, to the fixed-sum formulation of the two envelope paradox, where
the two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive possible states of the world that
determine the consequences of your actions are characterised in terms of the actual
contents of one of the envelopes, say A. (Katz and Olin 2007:p919)
Traditionally, in the version of the two-envelope problem where the agent is afforded the
opportunity of sighting the content of the allocated envelope, the probability associated
with the content being either the larger or the smaller is taken as the same. However,
the probability of the allocated envelope containing the larger amount may not be the
same as the probability of the envelope containing the smaller amount. Even considering
this possibility detracts from the problem and in this paper it will be demonstrated that
what one observes in the allocated envelope is a function of what was assigned to the first
envelope and the issue is not whether the allocated envelope contains the smaller or the
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larger amount. It is the process adopted by the host that dictates what the agent will
observe, in the allocated envelope, that is now relevant. Is the envelope into which the
initial amount assigned allocated to the agent before deciding what is to be assigned to
the second envelope? In this instance, the “halving or doubling” method must be used,
since if the “doubling-only” method were adopted, then the agent would know that the
complementary envelope contained twice the content of the randomly allocated envelope,
and it would be certain in all plays of the game that a switch would result in a guaranteed
benefit.
It will be demonstrated in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 that while it is true that the content
of the complementary envelope is twice or half of the content of the allocated envelope,
it is nonetheless meaningless and of no relevance to the resolution of the problem.
2.2 The method
It is also true that once the first and second envelopes are primed that each have equal
likelihood of been allocated to the agent. But, as will be noted in the strategy chapter
such probabilities are factored out in the expected benefit functions. The relevance of
equal likelihood for the allocation of the two envelopes is questioned by (Albers et al.
2005:p92)
The contextualising of the dilemma in the form of a story necessitates that the reader
must distill from the verbosity the essentials in order to formulate the problem. Smullyan
(1992) tackles the problem by not embracing probability. A subtle wording of what can
be gained or lost by switching would appear to be quite convincing in his particular
argument. Because the alternatives are equally likely, probability should be considered
(Chase 2002; Chihara 1995).
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2.2.1 Reason and logic
Some authors such as Smullyan (1992) and Chihara (1995), pose the problem as a story
and then proceed logically to solve it.
Chen (2007) and Rawling (1994:p102) argue that neither Proposition 1 nor Proposition
2, as proposed by Smullyan (1992:p190), are correct, and the very wording of the propo-
sitions is questioned by (Albers et al. 2005:p92).
It is acknowledged by many authors that no resolution to the paradox is possible with the
available information. What is necessary is additional information, or the agent will need
to make assumptions before attempting to resolve the problem. As such the problem
is open to interpretation and the vague statement of the problem is probably the very
reason that the literature is peppered with such diverse responses.
Some authors Cargile (1992), Smullyan (1992) and Chen (2007) tackle the problem us-
ing disciplines outside of the field of probability. Some papers (Sutton 2010:p10) of a
philosophical nature acknowledge the need to resolve the problem by embracing a prob-
abilistic argument. It will be noted that there is a convergence of argument and in many
instances there is an agreement albeit from different disciplines. This confluence of ideas
and argument are all lending credence to the demise of the apparent paradox.
2.2.2 Probability
The many different attempts to explain the legitimacy of the paradox stems from the fact
that many authors are not well versed in the discipline of probability. The fundamentals
essential to the probabilistic approach would seem to be taken for granted and in many
instances the mere referencing to Bayesian or conditional probabilities would seem to add
an air of legitimacy to the authors intent. The narrative that is used to deliver the problem
is not very clear and care, as advocated by Vazquez (2012:p2), needs to be exercised by
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the reader who is tempted to claim that he or she can resolve the two-envelope problem
and thereby explain the paradox. In many instances attempts to resolve the paradox
only reinforces and perpetuates the myth.
According to Broome (1995); Jackson et al. (1994), the distribution from which the host
samples the initial amount is essential for the agent to derive an appropriate switching
strategy. The distribution function that represents the initial monetary amount from
which the host will sample, can be either discrete or continuous; this however is never
mentioned in the usual statement of the problem. As shown in Chapter 4, this information
is essential for the agent to derive an appropriate density function. For any successful
strategy, the density function must be known by the agent to support the identification
of an appropriate switching strategy (Jackson et al. 1994).
While many authors recognise the conditional probability (Bayesian) is necessary to derive
an appropriate switching strategy, they unfortunately fail to recognise that the expected
benefit is conditional on the sub-σ-algebra induced by the amount observed in the al-
located envelope (Ash 1972:p249). This necessitates that the agent be informed of the
distribution function from which the host sampled the initial amount that was assigned to
the first envelope. The resultant event space immediately lends itself readily to a solution
that overcomes many of the concerns that have been expressed, as a means to justify or
dismiss the paradox (Ok 2007:p12). Concerns, about infinite amounts of money that are
labelled as absurd and devoid of all reality and therefore dismissed are no longer an issue
when the event space is recognised as a sub-σ-algebra. Whether the amounts of money
in the financial system are infinite - the FED can always print more - or not, is besides
the point (Rawling 1994).
The expected benefit is succinctly expressed as the conditional expectation for the sub-
σ-algebra induced by the observed amount, as discussed by Spanos (2013:p3) and Ash
(1972:p249).
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2.3 Switching strategies
In instances where the amounts are bounded, strategies can be derived without much
effort, as will be detailed in Chapter 4.
It can be said that whether a distribution function has a finite mean or not is irrelevant for
the identification of an appropriate switching strategy. Broome (1995) correctly states
the problem that the agent is confronted with as one where he or she must consider
the expected content of the complementary envelope once the content of the allocated
envelope is revealed.
In some instances, the density function may support the notion that switching is always
beneficial. In no way is this paradoxical; it is rather a consequence of the density func-
tion. Any density functions with a finite mean will not support the paradox. Broome
(1995:p8) states that a switching strategy can be identified that will yield the greatest ex-
pected benefit for any observed amount from the allocated envelope. While distribution
functions possessing no finite mean will always support the paradox, they render sighting
the content of the allocated envelope redundant and support the notion that switching
is always beneficial.
If the amounts assigned to the envelopes by the host are bounded, then knowledge of
this by the agent is necessary. In such an instance, the paradox would not exist since it
would not be beneficial for the agent to switch if the content of the allocated envelope
were found to be greater than half the upper bound. Should the observed amount be less
than twice the lower bound, however, then it would be advantageous to switch.
It is possible for the agent, upon sighting the content and observing the amount Y = y, to
determine the conditional expectation of the benefit when switching envelopes. It will be
realised that the conditional expectation is a function of the sub-σ-algebra induced by Y .
This realisation immediately eliminates some of the absurdities that have been espoused
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as the cause of the paradox. Absurdities such as the infinite sets, are immediately reduced
to finite sets, as a result of the induced sub-σ-algebra (Spanos 2013).
It has been proposed by McDonnell and Abbott (2009:p3,p12), Bruss and Ruschendorf
(2000:p7), and Gill (2011:p14) that a strategy could be based on “Cover’s switching
function”. This will be less than ideal in some instances and an exact switching strategy
can be derived from the provided distribution function. In the absence of a provided
distribution function, through an adaptive strategy, the agent can assume a distribution
whose parameters are refined upon the completion of each game.
It is also worth mentioning, as proved by Broome (1995:p10), that no distribution function
possessing a finite mean can be “paradoxical”. In such instances there will be an interval
over which it would be beneficial to switch envelopes and alternative intervals where
switching would not be beneficial. Similarly, in the presence of bounds, it will not always
be beneficial to switch.
2.3.1 The paradox
Most authors attempt to resolve the paradox by comparing the content of the two en-
velopes. For whatever the content of the envelopes, the complementary envelope will
always be half or twice the content of the allocated envelope. This justifies the switching.
In this paper the content of the allocated envelope is treated as a constant (rigid desig-
nator) and the possibility of the content of the allocated envelope taking on the larger
or the smaller amount is never in doubt. As such this aligns with the philosophical ap-
proach proposed by authors McGrew et al. (1997), Rawling (1994), and Priest and Restall
(2007), who claim to have settled the issue of the paradox. In most of these instances they
are dismiss the paradox on the grounds that the content of the allocated envelope must
treated as a rigid designator (Chase 2002; Chen 2007; Sutton 2010). These arguments
call on the disciplines of logic and are in this paper substantiated by the appropriate
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application of probabilistic argument.
Sutton (2010) recognises the need for a probabilistic approach and that the inevitable
resolution of the two-envelope problem will be understood by philosophers.
Broome (1995) approaches the paradox by considering that the smaller monetary amount
is essential and then proceeds to derive a function that expresses the expectation as a
result of switching. There are two distributions presented by Broome (1995) to support
the strategy of always switching. Broome (1995) acknowledges that these distributions,
although valid, possess no finite mean, and demonstrates that no distribution with a
finite mean (even an infinite distribution) can be paradoxical.
2.4 Summary
As will be noted from the aforementioned there are any number of attempts to resolve the
two-envelope problem from a diverse array of disciplines. Many practitioners have relied
on an extensive array of simple and complex arguments to justify their conclusions. And
in most instances there is a reliance on a mathematical formulation of the problem. It is
this formulation that I believe is the cause of the paradox. As will be seen, provided that
there is information, then a strategy can be identified that will yield a greatest expected
benefit for any play of the game.
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Chapter 3
Posing the two-envelope problem
What is essential is invisible to the eye.
— The Little Prince (de Saint-Exupéry 1945:p70)
The game of switching envelopes, which lends its name to the two-envelope paradox, is
based on the problem that confronts an agent who must identify a strategy to maximise
the expected benefit by either retaining the allocated envelope and its contents or choosing
the complementary envelope and its contents. The host of the game is responsible for
assigning the amounts of money, according to a specified content and allocation process,
to each of the two envelopes. The money assigned to the first envelope is a randomly
identified amount that is distributed according to some probability density function. The
second amount is dependent upon the amount assigned to the first envelope; it could be
either half or double that amount depending on the “content” component of the content
and allocation process.
The random allocation of the two indistinguishable envelopes will see the agent receiving
one of them. Neither the agent nor the host at the time of allocation can discern the
contents and neither would they, until the contents are revealed, be in a position to
comment on the appropriate switching strategy.
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We divide the two-envelope game into two stages: the activities of the host (stage 1) and
the strategy of the agent (stage 2). The host of the game conducts three experiments
in stage 1. The first experiment is the random sampling from an arbitrary distribution
function, the second experiment is the tossing of an unbiased coin, and the third and
final experiment is the tossing of the same coin again. In stage 2, the agent identifies the
envelope-switching strategy that yields the greatest expected benefit, which is determined
by considering the expected difference between the content of the complementary envelope
and the content of the allocated envelope.
Bruss and Ruschendorf (2000) and Broome (1995) are among the authors to state that
the content (the smaller amount) of the first envelope is identified by the host and that
a subsequent amount that is twice the initial amount is assigned to a second envelope.
On the other hand, Sobel (1994:p69) refers specifically to halving or doubling the initial
amount depending on the outcome of a random event. In yet other instances, no consid-
eration is paid to the content and allocation process. However, this paper demonstrates
that distinguishing between the two processes is important as they may yield distinctly
different strategies. Where sighting the content of the randomly allocated envelope is
prohibited, the content allocation process is irrelevant (Bruss 1996:p117).
3.1 The host’s activities
The concept of a probability space (Ω,F, P ) is introduced, where Ω is the sample space,
F the event space, and P the probability measure on F. All subsets of Ω are events, and
F consists of all subsets of Ω.
Experiment 1, performed by the host, involves identifying the initial amount of money
that is assigned to the first envelope. The initial amount is drawn from a cumulative dis-
tribution function, which is either given or derived from an arbitrary probability density
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function.
The outcome of Experiment 2, performed by the host, is used to decide whether to halve
or double the initial amount and assign the resultant amount to the second envelope.
The outcome of Experiment 3, performed by the host, is used to decide whether to
allocate the first or the second envelope to the agent. The remaining envelope will be
referred to as the complementary envelope.
The grand experiment, for consideration by the agent, and the associated product prob-
ability space is a function of these three independent host-conducted experiments. As-
sociated with each of them is an appropriate probability space that would need careful
consideration by the agent in order for him or her to identify an appropriate strategy.
Experiment 1. X1 is a random variable on (Ω1;F1;P1). X1 represents the initial amount
of money identified by the host and assigned to the first of the two envelopes.
The sample space associated with the drawing of an initial random amount x1 represented
by the random variable X1, where X1 ∼ fX1(x1), is defined as:
Ω1 = {ω1 : xl < X1(ω1) ≤ xu} .
This initial amount X1(ω1) = x1 is assigned to the first of the two envelopes. Unless
otherwise specified, the notation X1(ω) = x1 is hereafter represented by X1 = x1. The
sample space for drawing the initial amount is determined by the host. We can see it as
the values between xl and xu.
Experiment 2. X2 is a random variable on (Ω2;F2;P2). X2 represents the outcome of
the toss of an unbiased coin. The sample space is
Ω2 = {0; 1}
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X2(ω2) = ω2 and P (ω2) = 1/2 ∀ω2 ∈ {0; 1}.
ω2 =


0, halve the initial amount;
1, double the initial amount.
Experiment 3. X3 is a random variable on (Ω3;F3;P3). X3 also represents the outcome
of the toss of an unbiased coin. The sample space is again
Ω3 = {0; 1}
X3(ω3) = ω3 and P (ω3) = 1/2 ∀ω3 ∈ {0; 1}.
ω3 =


0, allocate the first envelope to the agent;
1, allocate the second envelope to the agent.
3.2 The agent
The probability space that the agent would need to consider is
(Ω;F;P ) = (Ω1 × Ω2 × Ω3;F1 × F2 × F3;P1 × P2 × P3)
and the sample space for the agent (product measure space of the host) is expressed as
Ω = Ω1 × Ω2 × Ω3.
Since the experiments are conducted independently, it can be said that P = P1×P2×P3
and the proof of the existence of such a P on F is an application of Carathéodory’s
extension theorem (Athreya and Lahiri 2010:p24).
For any outcome {c} = {x1;ω2;ω3} ∈ F, since the outcomes (events) x1, ω2, and ω3
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originate from each of the independent experiments, then
P ({c}) = P ({x1;ω2;ω3})
= P (X1 = x1;X2 = ω2;X3 = ω3)
= P (X1 = x1)P (X2 = ω2)P (X3 = ω3). (3.1)
3.3 Envelope contents
Knowledge of the process that the host adopted for the priming of the envelopes is crucial
for the agent to determine an appropriate switching strategy. Most formulations of the
problem centre on the “doubling-only” or “halving or doubling” processes. A “halving-
only” process is introduced as the analog of the “doubling-only” process and it will assist
with the derivation of the different switching strategies.
Having randomly identified an initial amount X1 = x1, the host assigns this to the first
of the two indistinguishable envelopes. To the second envelope, the host will assign an
amount X ′1 that is dependent on the outcome of the toss of an unbiased coin. The
transformation associated with the halving or doubling of the initial amount is as follows:
X ′1 =
(
1
2
(1−X2) + 2X2
)
X1 (3.2)
where
X2 =


0, halve the initial amount;
1, double the initial amount.
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Thus, the probability of any outcome {c} = {x1;ω2;ω3} associated with the “halving or
doubling” process after applying 3.1 is
P ({c}) = 1
4
P (X1 = x1). (3.3)
The “halving or doubling” process is a combination of the “halving-only” and the “doubling-
only” processes. Each of these processes can be realised by setting the relevant parameter
ω2.
3.3.1 Doubling-only
For the “doubling-only” process, the host only doubles the content of the first envelope
and assigns this amount to the second envelope. Formally, X ′1 = 2X1.
This can be realised by setting X2(ω2) = ω2 = 1. Ω2 = {1} and P (ω2) = 1. Therefore,
noting that {c} = {x1; 1;ω3}, after applying (3.1)
P ({c}) = 1
2
P (X1 = x1). (3.4)
3.3.2 Halving-only
For the “halving-only” process, the host only halves the content of the first envelope and
assigns this amount to the second envelope. Formally, X ′1 = X1/2.
This can be realised by setting X2(ω2) = ω2 = 0. Ω2 = {0} and P (ω2) = 1. Therefore,
noting that {c} = (x1; 0;ω3), after applying (3.1)
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P ({c}) = 1
2
P (X1 = x1). (3.5)
3.4 The envelope allocation
After priming the envelopes, the host randomly selects one of the indistinguishable en-
velopes and allocates this envelope to the agent. The agent’s envelope and its associated
contents y are represented by the random variable Y , while the complementary envelope
and its associated contents z are represented by the random variable Z.
The transformation process associated with the allocation of the envelopes and their
respective contents can be expressed as follows:
C =
[
Y Z
]
=
[
X1 X
′
1
] [
A
]
= X1
[
1 1
2
(1−X2) + 2X2
] [
A
]
(3.6)
where
A =

1−X3 X3
X3 1−X3

 ,
X2 =


0, halve the initial amount;
1, double the initial amount,
and
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X3 =


0, allocate the first envelope to the agent;
1, allocate the second envelope to the agent.
3.5 The benefit of switching envelopes
Since the objective of the agent is to identify an envelope-switching strategy that yields
the greatest expected benefit for any observed Y = y, it is convenient to expand (3.6) and
accordingly derive the benefit function in the event of switching the randomly allocated
envelope for the complementary envelope.
The content of the agent’s envelope is
Y = X1
[
1 1
2
(1−X2) + 2X2
]1−X3
X3

 . (3.7)
The content of the complementary envelope is
Z = X1
[
1 1
2
(1−X2) + 2X2
] X3
1−X3

 . (3.8)
The benefit of switching envelopes is
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B = Z − Y
= C

−1
1


=
[
X1 X
′
1
]2X3 − 1
1− 2X3


=
1
2
(2X3 − 1)(1− 3X2)X1. (3.9)
It will be noted that this expression makes no direct reference to the content of the com-
plementary envelope. The benefit is therefore entirely dependent on the initial amount
identified by the host and the halving or doubling of this initial amount to determine
the content of the second envelope. Finally, the random allocation of the envelopes,
determines what is revealed in the allocated envelope.
3.6 Summary
The host, having performed three experiments, assigns the initial amount to the first
of the two envelopes and then assigned an amount to the second envelope, which is a
function of the first amount. One of the primed envelopes is then randomly allocated to
the agent.
The agent may receive the envelope containing X1 = x1 and refer to the content as “Y ”;
alternatively, he or she may receive the envelope containing the amount associated with
X ′1 and similarly refer to this as “Y ”.
In all instances, the allocation process will commence with the identification of an initial
amount x1, represented by the random variable X1, which can be assumed to originate
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from a density function fX1(x1). If the agent is not informed of the distribution function
FX1(x1) from which the host sampled the initial amount, then the agent can assume or
estimate the density function fX1(x1). Suffice to say that the agent will be informed
and can in the presence of the density function fX1(x1), together with the content and
allocation process derive an appropriate switching strategy.
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Chapter 4
The expected benefit of information
Words are the source of misunderstandings.
— The Little Prince (de Saint-Exupéry 1945:p65)
A switching strategy that optimises the expected outcome for any observed amount is
possible if the agent is provided with information about the distribution function from
which the initial amount was identified. This provision of information implies that the
agent is informed about the content and allocation process as well as the distribution
function from which the host randomly selected the initial amount. Not only is the
distribution function essential for the agent to identify a strategy, but the content and
allocation process is also crucial, as will be demonstrated in the strategy associated with
the halving or doubling process. With this information, the agent can derive a game
strategy that will enable him or her, for any observed amount, to identify the expected
benefit and in so doing possess the information that will facilitate the decision to retain
the allocated envelope and its contents or to switch to the complementary envelope and
its contents.
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4.1 Essential information for the agent
If the agent is not informed about the distribution function from which the original
X1 = x1 was selected, he or she may assume the existence of a prior density function.
In addition, consequent to each play of the game, the agent may revise the guessed prior
density function for the subsequent play of the game. However, irrespective of whether the
agent has derived such a density function or not, the density function under consideration
will be referred to as fX1(x1).
Without loss of generality, any reference to distribution will imply a cumulative distri-
bution function whether associated with a discrete – or a continuous random variable.
Similarly, there will be no notational distinction between a probability mass function as-
sociated with a discrete random variable and the alternative probability density function
associated with a continuous random variable. The terms “discrete” and “continuous” are
used to indicate the nature of the density function and similarly the distribution function.
Since the objective of the game is to identify a strategy that will yield the greatest
expected benefit, it is necessary to assume that all plays of the game are made by a
risk-neutral and rational agent.
The agent will need to consider the content and allocation process adopted by the host
and nature of the distribution function from which the host will sample the initial amount
that will be assigned to the first envelope. The only information available to the host
and the agent once the envelopes are allocated is the distribution from which the host
sampled, the content and allocation process. The fact that the content of one envelope
is double the content of the other, while true, is of no significance in determining the
appropriate switching strategy. But, if one were informed that the agent had adopted
the “doubling-only” process then it would be correct to say that the content of the second
envelope is primed by doubling the amount assigned to the first envelope.
37
The agent will need to identify — for the observed amount y revealed in the randomly
allocated envelope represented by the random variable Y — the expected benefit to be
had by exercising the option of switching envelopes and therefore obtaining the expected
content of the complementary envelope Z.
The benefit is represented by the random variable B and is derived from the difference
B = Z−Y between the amount (not known) in the complementary envelope, represented
by the random variable Z, and the content (observed) of the randomly allocated envelope,
represented by the random variable Y .
4.2 The events associated with the sighted amount
For the agent to observe an amount Y = y the host would have had to have sampled an
initial amount that may have been any one of the members of the set x1 ∈ {y/2; y; 2y}. It
is the informed agent that can derive an appropriate switching strategy. This is immedi-
ately recognisable when the agent considers the sub-σ-algebra of relevant events induced
by the observed amount Y = y (Ash 1972). The conditional expected benefit of switching
the allocated envelope for the complementary envelope is then easily derived when the
appropriate event space is considered (Spanos 2013).
x1 ∈


{
y
2
; y
}
, for “doubling-only”;
{y; 2y} , for “halving-only”;
{
y
2
; y; 2y
}
, for “halving or doubling”.
Suffice it to say, the contents of the envelopes are fixed and therefore the agent will reveal
the content of the randomly allocated envelope to be Y = y. The agent will not know
if this is the smaller amount and that the complementary envelope contains Z = 2y or
the larger amount and that the complementary envelope then contains Z = y/2. While
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this statement may appear to relevant it will be revealed that this is nothing more than
an interesting comment with no relevance to the agent when deriving the appropriate
switching strategy. What is now relevant is the original amount identified by the host
and how the content and allocation process impacts on this initial amount that ultimately
determines what will be revealed in the envelope that is allocated to the agent.
The following examples serve to explain the necessity of the agent, when observing Y = y
in the randomly allocated envelope, to consider that the host — having adopted a halving
or doubling process — may have selected an initial amount x1 ∈ {y/2; y; 2y}. Each
of these possibilities x1 ∈ {y/2; y; 2y} is essential for the agent to identify a suitable
switching strategy to realise the (greatest) expected benefit for any observed Y = y in
the randomly allocated envelope.
Consideration will be given to the “doubling-only” strategy and, for the sake of expediency,
a “halving-only” strategy will be introduced. By combining these two strategies a “halving
or doubling” strategy will be derived. The “halving-only” strategy, as the complement of
the “doubling-only” strategy, will be recognised as a distinct yet significant component of
the “halving or doubling” strategy. To facilitate the derivation of the respective strategies
for both discrete and continuous variables the concept of a sub-σ-algebra, induced by Y ,
will be introduced for each of the strategies.
What is relevant to the agent, upon sighting the content of the allocated envelope, is
not the event space F but the event space F′ induced by the observed amount Y (Ash
1972:p250). With this information the agent is able to determine the expected benefit of
switching for any observed Y = y (Ok 2007:p12).
4.2.1 A “doubling-only” strategy
The agent observes Y = y and considers the effects of the host having selected x1 ∈
{y/2; y}. It is now essential for the agent to determine the values of X3 = ω3 for which
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the allocated envelope would contain Y = y, when considering each of the initial assigned
amounts x1 ∈ {y/2; y}. X2 = ω2 = 1.
Case 1. The host assigns the amount X1 = y/2 to the first envelope . The host doubles
the initial amount and assigns this amount X ′1 = 2X1 = y to the second envelope, and
then allocates this second envelope to the agent, who will observe the amount Y = y.
By substituting X1 = y/2, Y = y. and ω2 = 1 into (3.7) and solving for ω3, we find
y = ((1− ω3) + 2ω3)y
2
.
The only possible solution to this equation is when ω3 = 1 (allocating the second envelope
to the agent). The event {c} = {y/2; 1; 1} is thus realised; consequently, by substitution
into (3.8), Z = y/2 and therefore
b({c}) = b({y/2; 1; 1}) = −y/2
and
P ({c}) = P ({y/2; 1; 1}) = 1
2
P (X1 = y/2).
Case 2. The host assigns the amount X1 = y to the first envelope .The host doubles the
initial amount and assigns this amount X ′1 = 2X1 = 2y to the second envelope. If the
first envelope is allocated, observe the amount Y = y.
By substituting X1 = y, Y = y, and ω2 = 1 into (3.7) and solving for ω3, we find
y = ((1− ω3) + 2ω3)y.
The only possible solution to this equation is when ω3 = 0 (allocating the first envelope
to the agent). The event {c} = {y; 1; 0} is thus realised; consequently, by substitution
into (3.8), Z = 2y and therefore
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b({c}) = b({y; 1; 0}) = y
and
P ({c}) = P ({y; 1; 0}) = 1
2
P (X1 = y).
Consequently, the set of events for consideration are
Cy = {{x1;ω2;ω3} : {y/2; 1; 1} ; {y; 1; 0}} . (4.1)
4.2.2 A “halving-only” strategy
The agent observes Y = y and considers the effects of the host having selected x1 ∈
{y; 2y}. It is now essential for the agent to determine the values of X3 = ω3 for which
the allocated envelope would contain Y = y, when considering each of the initial assigned
amounts x1 ∈ {y; 2y}. X2 = ω2 = 0.
Case 3. The host assigns the amount X1 = y to the first envelope. The host halves the
initial amount and assigns this amount X ′1 = y/2 to the second envelope. If the first
envelope is allocated, then the agent will observe the amount Y = y.
By substituting X1 = y, Y = y, and ω2 = 0 into (3.7) and solving for ω3, we find
y = (1− 1
2
ω3)y.
The only possible solution to this equation is when ω3 = 0 (allocating the first envelope
to the agent). The event {c} = {y; 0; 0} is thus realised; consequently, by substitution
into (3.8), Z = y/2 and therefore
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b({c}) = b({y; 0; 0}) = −y/2
and
P ({c}) = P ({y; 0; 0}) = 1
2
P (X1 = y).
Case 4. The host assigns the amount X1 = 2y to the first envelope. The host halves the
initial amount and assigns this amount X ′1 = y to the second envelope, and then allocates
this second envelope to the agent, then the agent will observe the amount Y = y.
By substituting X1 = 2y, Y = y. and ω2 = 0 into (3.7) and solving for ω3, we find
y = (1− 1
2
ω3)2y.
The only possible solution to this equation is when ω3 = 1 (allocating the second envelope
to the agent). The event {c} = {2y; 0; 1} is thus realised; consequently, by substitution
into (3.8), Z = 2y and therefore
b({c}) = b({2y; 0; 1}) = y
and
P ({c}) = P ({2y; 0; 1}) = 1
2
P (X1 = 2y).
Consequently, the set of events for consideration are
C ′y = {{x1;ω2;ω3} : {y; 0; 0} ; {2y; 0; 1}} . (4.2)
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4.2.3 A “halving or doubling” strategy
This strategy, it will be realised, is a combination of the “halving-only” and the “doubling-
only” strategies.
The agent observes Y = y and considers the effects of the host having selected x1 ∈
{y/2; y; 2y}. It is now essential for the agent to identify the events that would describe
the host’s activities, namely determine the values of ω2 and ω3 for which the allocated
envelope would contain Y = y, when he or she considers each of the initial assigned
amounts x1 ∈ {y/2; y; 2y}.
The combined events associated with the “halving-only” and “doubling-only” process are
necessary for the “halving or doubling” process.
Cy = Cy ∪ C ′y
= {{x1;ω2;ω3} : {y/2; 1; 1} ; {y; 0; 0} ; {y; 1; 0} ; {2y; 0; 1}} . (4.3)
4.2.4 Expected benefit associated with discrete variables
The events of relevance to the agent for the identification of a strategy that will realise
the expected benefit for any observed amount Y = y are the members (events) of Cy, C
′
y,
or of Cy, depending on which content and allocation has been adopted by the host.
For the “doubling-only” strategy
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E(B
∣∣Y = y) = E(B∣∣Cy)
=
∑
{c}∈Cy
b({c})P ({c})
∑
{c}∈Cy
P ({c})
=
−y
2
P (X1 =
y
2
) + yP (X1 = y)
P (X1 =
y
2
) + P (X1 = y)
. (4.4)
For the “halving-only” strategy
E(B
∣∣Y = y) = E(B∣∣C ′y)
=
∑
{c}∈C′y
b({c})P ({c})
∑
{c}∈C′y
P ({c})
=
−y
2
P (X1 = y) + yP (X1 = 2y)
P (X1 = y) + P (X1 = 2y)
. (4.5)
For the “halving or doubling” strategy, from (4.4) and (4.5)
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E(B
∣∣Y = y) = E(B∣∣Cy)
=
∑
{c}∈Cy
b({c})P ({c})
∑
{c}∈Cy
P ({c})
=
∑
{c}∈Cy∪C′y
b({c})P ({c})
∑
{c}∈Cy∪C′y
P ({c})
=
∑
{c}∈Cy
b({c})P ({c}) + ∑
{c}∈C′y
b({c})P ({c})
∑
{c}∈Cy
P ({c}) + ∑
{c}∈C′y
P ({c})
=
−y
2
P (X1 =
y
2
) + y
2
P (X1 = y) + yP (X1 = 2y)
P (X1 =
y
2
) + 2P (X1 = y) + P (X1 = 2y)
. (4.6)
4.3 Continuous random variables
All discussions have centred on the agent observing an amount that is represented by a
discrete random variable. It is possible that the observed amount can be represented by
a continuous random variable. The probability of any observed amount represented by a
continuous random variable, as is known, is zero (Ok 2007:p12). However, if the observed
amount is centred on an interval, the length of which tends to zero, then it is possible to
derive a function for the continuous random variable analogous to that for the discrete
random variable. This variant of the problem will permit the derivation of a strategy
associated with an amount that is represented by a continuous random variable.
Probabilities associated with continuous variables require a little more care in order to
facilitate the derivation of appropriate switching strategies. Probabilities associated with
intervals are easily dealt with for continuous variables. This feature will be exploited
by considering intervals of lengths, that are proportionately ε, 2ε, and 4ε in length.
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For any chosen interval, the limit as ε tends to zero will be exploited. As noted by
(Ash 1972:p241), (Mood et al. 1974:p61), (Brams and Kilgour 1995:p30), and (Broome
1995:p10), the approximation does yield the appropriate switching function.
Where fX1(x) is continuous, the following approach is adopted. For the agent to observe
an amount in the allocated envelope, from the interval y − ε < Y ≤ y + ε, the agent
would have to consider the activities of the host in drawing, depending on the content
and allocation process, an initial amount from the set of intervals:
4.3.1 Probability
P (X = x) is not true for a continuous probability density function fX(x). However, it
can be approximated as described by Ash (1972:241–261) and Mood et al. (1974:61).
x− ε
fX(x)
x x+ ε
fX(x) =
dFX(x)
dx
= lim
ε→0
FX(x+ ε)− FX(x− ε)
2ε
Hence,
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fX(x)2ε ≈ FX(x+ ε)− FX(x− ε) =P (x− ε < X ≤ x+ ε)
=P (X ≤ x+ ε)− P (X ≤ x− ε)
=
∫ y+ε
y−ε
fX1(x1)dx1
4.3.2 Expectation
The σ-algebra induced by the observed amount is very convenient. For the random object
Y : (Ω;F) −→ (Ω′;F′), then the σ-algebra induced by Y is given by F(Y ) = Y −1(F′)
(Ash 1972:p250). And, the conditional expectation E(B
∣∣Y = y) is well defined for any
number Y = y even though Y = y may be a probability zero event (Ok 2007:p12).
It would be beneficial to derive an appropriate definition for the expectation of continuous
variable X over a stated interval y − ε < X ≤ y + ε (Rényi 1970:265). Then
E(X = y) ≈ lim
ε→0
E(X
∣∣y − ε < X ≤ y + ε)
= lim
ε→0
∫ y+ε
y−ε
xfX(x)dx∫ y+ε
y−ε
fX(x)dx
= lim
ε→0
yfX(y)2ε
fX(y)2ε
= y
4.3.3 A “doubling-only” strategy
For the “doubling-only” process
Cy =
⋃
ω3∈{0;1}
{{x1, 1, ω3} : 2−ω3(y − ε) < x1 ≤ 2−ω3(y + ε)} .
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Noting, from (3.9), that
b({c}) = b({x1; 1;ω3}) =


x1, for ω3 = 0;
−x1, for ω3 = 1,
and following from (3.1) then
E(B
∣∣Y = y) ≈ lim
ε→0
E(B
∣∣y − ε < Y ≤ y + ε)
= lim
ε→0
E(B
∣∣Cy)
= lim
ε→0
∫
Cy
b({c})fX1(x1)dx1∫
Cy
fX1(x1)dx1
= lim
ε→0
− ∫ y2+ ε2y
2
− ε
2
x1fX1(x1)dx1 +
∫ y+ε
y−ε
x1fX1(x1)dx1∫ y
2
+ ε
2
y
2
− ε
2
fX1(x1)dx1 +
∫ y+ε
y−ε
fX1(x1)dx1
≈ lim
ε→0
−y
2
fX1(
y
2
)ε+ yfX1(y)2ε
fX1(
y
2
)ε+ fX1(y)2ε
=
−y
2
fX1(
y
2
) + 2yfX1(y)
fX1(
y
2
) + 2fX1(y)
. (4.7)
It is worth noting that this function is in agreement with the function derived by Broome
(1995:p10) for the E(Z
∣∣Y = y). By subtracting the observed amount Y = y from the
expression derived by Broome (1995), the function as derived above can be obtained.
4.3.4 A “halving-only” strategy
For the “halving-only” process
C ′y =
⋃
ω3∈{0;1}
{{x1, 0, ω3} : 2ω3(y − ε) < x1 ≤ 2ω3(y + ε)} .
Noting, from (3.9), that
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b({c}) = b({x1; 0;ω3}) =


−1
2
x1, for ω3 = 0;
1
2
x1, for ω3 = 1,
and following from (3.1) then
E(B
∣∣Y = y) ≈ lim
ε→0
E(B
∣∣y − ε < Y ≤ y + ε)
= lim
ε→0
E(B
∣∣C ′y)
= lim
ε→0
∫
C′y
b({c})fX1(x1)dx1∫
C′y
fX1(x1)dx1
= lim
ε→0
−1
2
∫ y+ε
y−ε
x1fX1(x1)dx1 +
1
2
∫ 2y+2ε
2y−2ε
x1fX1(x1)dx1∫ y+ε
y−ε
fX1(x1)dx1 +
∫ 2y+2ε
2y−2ε
fX1(x1)dx1
≈ lim
ε→0
−yfX1(y)ε+ 4yfX1(y)ε
2fX1(y)ε+ 4fX1(2y)ε
=
−yfX1(y) + 4yfX1(2y)
2fX1(y) + 4fX1(2y)
. (4.8)
4.3.5 A “halving or doubling” strategy
The combined events associated with the “halving-only” and “doubling-only” process are
necessary for the “halving or doubling” process.
Cy = Cy ∪ C ′y.
However, if fX1(x) were continuous, the following approach would be adopted. For the
agent to observe an amount in the allocated envelope, from the interval y−ε < Y ≤ y+ε,
he or she would, assuming the “halving or doubling” process, have to consider the activities
of the host in drawing an initial amount from the set of intervals:
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E(B
∣∣Y = y) ≈ lim
ε→0
E(B
∣∣y − ε < Y ≤ y + ε)
= lim
ε→0
E(B
∣∣Cy)
= lim
ε→0
E(B
∣∣Cy ∪ C ′y)
= lim
ε→0
∫
Cy
b({c})fX1(x1)dx1 +
∫
C′y
b({c})fX1(x1)dx1∫
Cy
fX1(x1)dx1 +
∫
C′y
fX1(x1)dx1
= lim
ε→0
− ∫ y2+ ε2y
2
− ε
2
x1fX1(x1)dx1 +
1
2
∫ y+ε
y−ε
x1fX1(x1)dx1 +
1
2
∫ 2y+2ε
2y−2ε
x1fX1(x1)dx1∫ y
2
+ ε
2
y
2
− ε
2
fX1(x1)dx1 + 2
∫ y+ε
y−ε
fX1(x1)dx1 +
∫ 2y+2ε
2y−2ε
fX1(x1)dx1
≈ lim
ε→0
−y
2
fX1(
y
2
)ε+ y
2
fX1(y)2ε+ yfX1(2y)4ε
fX1(
y
2
)ε+ 2fX1(y)2ε+ fX1(2y)4ε
=
−y
2
fX1(
y
2
) + yfX1(y) + 4yfX1(2y)
fX1(
y
2
) + 4fX1(y) + 4fX1(2y)
. (4.9)
Hence, the identification of the content assigned to the envelopes and the subsequent
allocation of the primed envelopes is independent of any game strategy identified by
the agent. However, the benefit of switching must be conditional upon the realised
(observed) amount Y = y, and not the distinctly different Y = X1 = x1 or Y = X
′
1 =
(1/2(1−ω2)+2ω2)X1. The only events that generate Y = y, the amount observed by the
agent in the allocated envelope, are associated with the host selecting an initial amount
X1 = x1 where x1 ∈ {y/2; y; 2y} and assigning this amount to the first envelope.
4.4 A switching strategy
If the host were to impose bounds on the amounts allocated, then the agent would need
to consider what impact this would have on the host’s activities and consequently on his
or her own strategy.
The agent, if informed about the density function from which the monetary amounts were
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drawn should play as follows. If a lower bound xl is specified and all monetary amounts
are greater than or equal to this lower bound xl, then if the content of the chosen envelope
is revealed to be less than 2xl, the agent should switch. Similarly, if an upper bound xu
is specified and all monetary amounts are less than or equal to this upper bound xu, then
if the content is revealed to be greater than xu/2, the agent should not switch. For all
other observed amounts 2xl < y ≤ xu/2, the agent would need to consider E(B
∣∣Y = y).
If E(B
∣∣Y = y) < 0, then the agent should not switch, whereas if E(B∣∣Y = y) > 0, then
the agent should switch, otherwise he or she should be indifferent.
The switching strategy s(y) can be expressed succinctly using an indicator function:
s(y) = yI[xl;2xl] + E(B
∣∣Y = y)I[2xl; 12xu] − y2I[ 12xu;xu]. (4.10)
The strategy for any observed xl ≤ y ≤ xu is as follows: For s(y) < 0, the agent should
not switch. For s(y) > 0, the agent should switch, and for s(y) = 0, the agent should be
indifferent.
It will be necessary for the agent to consider what the impact will be at the boundaries
2xl and xu/2. At these transition points it may necessitate that the agent evaluate the
expected benefit of switching, before deciding a particular action.
4.5 Other strategies
There are two other possible strategies that can be considered. One is associated with the
host priming the first envelope and allocating the envelope to the agent before assigning
an amount to the second and complementary envelope. And reciprocal to this is when
the host primes the first envelope and retains the envelope as the complement. The
second envelope is then primed before allocating it to the agent. It will be noted that
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the assigning of the amount to the second envelope, in both these instances, must be
associated with the “halving or doubling” process.
4.5.1 Allocate the first envelope
A strategy associated with the former is nothing more than a simple lottery in which you
have for certain the amount Y = y and the complementary envelope contains the expected
amount Z = y/4+y. In this instance there is an obvious benefit b(y) = y/4 to be had for
switching. The events of relevance in this instance are Cy = {{x1;ω2; 0} : {y; 0; 0} ; {y; 1; 0}}.
Here the content and process excludes switching ω3 = 0 and the probability of the initial
amount is of no relevance in the switching strategy. The benefit
b({c}) = b({x1;ω2; 0})
=


−1
2
x1, if ω2 = 0;
x1, if ω2 = 1.
For discrete variables the expected benefit would be
E(B
∣∣Y = y) = E(B∣∣Cy)
=
∑
{c}∈Cy
b({c})P ({c})
∑
{c}∈Cy
P ({c})
=
−y
2
P (X1 = y) + yP (X1 = y)
P (X1 = y) + P (X1 = y)
=
y
4
> 0. (4.11)
While for continuous variables
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Cy = {{x1;ω2; 0} : y − ε < x1 ≤ y + ε}
and following from (3.1) then
E(B
∣∣Y = y) ≈ lim
ε→0
E(B
∣∣y − ε < Y ≤ y + ε)
= lim
ε→0
E(B
∣∣Cy)
= lim
ε→0
∫
Cy
b({c})fX1(x1)dx1∫
Cy
fX1(x1)dx1
= lim
ε→0
−1
2
∫ y+ε
y−ε
x1fX1(x1)dx1 +
∫ y+ε
y−ε
x1fX1(x1)dx1∫ y+ε
y−ε
fX1(x1)dx1 +
∫ y+ε
y−ε
fX1(x1)dx1
= lim
ε→0
1
2
∫ y+ε
y−ε
x1fX1(x1)dx1
2
∫ y+ε
y−ε
fX1(x1)dx1
≈ lim
ε→0
1
2
yfX1(y)2ε
2fX1(y)2ε
=
y
4
> 0. (4.12)
and hence, irrespective of the type of variable, the same expected benefit is realised and
it would therefore always be beneficial for the agent to switch envelopes.
This strategy is alluded to by Cargile (1992:p212) and amounts considering a gamble on
the outcome of a fair coin at payoff of double or half, while in receipt of a certain amount
Y = y.
4.5.2 Allocate the second envelope
A strategy associated with the later is obtained similarly. The agent will reveal the
content of the allocated envelope to be Y = y. In this instance for the host may have
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generated an initial amount X1 = y/2 or X1 = 2y. The only possible host activity is
associated with the events Cy = {{x1;ω2; 1} : {y/2; 1; 1} ; {2y; 0; 1}}. Here the process
includes switching ω3 = 1 and the probability of the initial amounts X1 = y/2 and
X1 = 2y is significant in determining a switching strategy. Any strategy associated with
such a content and allocation process is dependent on the distribution function. The
benefit would be
b({c}) = b({x1;ω2; 1})
=


1
2
x1, if ω2 = 0;
−x1, if ω2 = 1.
For discrete variables the expected benefit would be
E(B
∣∣Y = y) = E(B∣∣Cy)
=
∑
{c}∈Cy
b(c)P (c)
∑
{c}∈Cy
P (c)
=
−y
2
P (X1 =
y
2
) + yP (X1 = 2y)
P (X1 =
y
2
) + P (X1 = 2y)
. (4.13)
Switching in this instance is now conditional upon the probability density function and
it will be always be beneficial to switch when
2P (2y) > P (
y
2
).
While for continuous variables
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Cy =
{{x1;ω2; 1} : 21−2ω2(y − ε) < x1 ≤ 21−2ω2(y + ε)}
then
E(B
∣∣Y = y) ≈ lim
ε→0
E(B
∣∣y − ε < Y ≤ y + ε)
= lim
ε→0
E(B
∣∣Cy)
= lim
ε→0
∫
Cy
b({c})fX1(x1)dx1∫
Cy
fX1(x1)dx1
= lim
ε→0
1
2
∫ 2y+2ε
2y−2ε
x1fX1(x1)dx1 −
∫ y
2
+ ε
2
y
2
− ε
2
x1fX1(x1)dx1∫ 2y+2ε
2y−2ε
fX1(x1)dx1 +
∫ y
2
+ ε
2
y
2
− ε
2
fX1(x1)dx1
≈ lim
ε→0
−y
2
fX1(
y
2
)ε+ 4yfX1(2y)ε
fX1(
y
2
)ε+ 4fX1(2y)ε
=
−y
2
fX1(
y
2
) + 4yfX1(2y)
fX1(
y
2
) + 4fX1(2y)
. (4.14)
Switching in this instance is now conditional upon the probability density function and
it will be always be beneficial to switch when
8fX1(2y) > fX1(
y
2
).
4.6 Summary
It is essential for the agent to be informed about the content and allocation process
adopted by the host in order to derive an appropriate switching strategy. As we have
demonstrated, the envelope-switching strategy is dependent on the content and allocation
process adopted by the host, and the distribution function from which the host sampled
the initial amount assigned to the first envelope. Once the agent is in possession of this
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information, the strategy is easily derived. This information includes not only the sighting
of the content of the allocated envelope, but also the adopted content and allocation
process.
A switching strategy to optimise the expected outcome for any observed Y = y is possible
if the agent is provided with this information. Moreover, the agent also needs to be
informed about the bounds xl and xu if they are applied. Hence, two distinct strategies
are available depending on the content and allocation process. Each strategy, depending
on the distribution function from which the initial amount is chosen, may result in a
different decision for any observed amount in the allocated envelope.
From the derived strategies it will be realised that the content of the complementary
envelope has no impact on the switching strategy. The content of the complementary
envelope is of nothing more than curiosity value?
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Chapter 5
Envelope-switching strategies
Some distribution functions are labelled paradoxical by Broome (1995). Such distribu-
tions are by their nature not paradoxical. Such an attribute is only possible because the
rate of monetary benefit exceeds the probability of such an event. As demonstrated by
the Weibull density function, some distribution functions that are not paradoxical. The
choice of density functions to demonstrate the aspects of the two-envelope problem for
discrete and continuous random variables is now presented. Many of these have already
been explored in the literature and are repeated here.
5.1 Uniform distribution
Suppose the agent is informed that the host has chosen to randomly sample the initial
amount from the standard uniform probability density function and that
fX1(x1) = 1 ∀ 0 < x1 ≤ 1.
Since X1 is a continuous random variable, applying (4.9) and (3.3) for the halving or
doubling process, we find
E(B
∣∣Y = y) = −y2 + y + 4y
1 + 4 + 4
=
y
2
.
Meanwhile, by applying 4.7 and (3.5) to the doubling-only process, we find
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E(B
∣∣Y = y) = −y2 + 2y
1 + 2
=
y
2
.
Therefore, for either of the content and allocation processes, the indicator function (4.10)
yields the same envelope-switching strategy:
s(y) =


y
2
, if 0 < y ≤ 1
2
, therefore switch;
−y
2
, if 1
2
< y ≤ 1, therefore do not switch.
5.2 Weibull distribution
Suppose the agent is informed that the host has chosen to randomly sample the initial
amount from a Weibull probability density function and that
X ∼ fX(x, λ, k) = k
λ
(x
λ
)k−1
e−(
x
λ)
k
∀ x ≥ 0.
We set the parameter
λ =
1
2
and for k = 2 the distribution function is also referred to as the “Rayleigh distribution”.
Then
X ∼ fX(x) = fX(x, 1
2
, 2) = 8xe−(2x)
2 ∀ x > 0.
The expected benefit for an observed Y = y is then expressed as follows.
5.2.1 Strategy associated with the “doubling-only” process
Applying (4.7)
58
E(B
∣∣Y = y) = −y2fX1(y2) + 2yfX1(y)
fX1(
y
2
) + 2fX1(y)
= y
8e−3y
2 − 1
8e−3y2 + 2
.
The concept of an exchange condition e(y) has been introduced by Blachman and Kilgour
(2001:p175) and as a result
E(B
∣∣Y = y) = e(y)
8e−3y2 + 2
.
The denominator in E(B
∣∣Y = y) will always be positive. Solving for y in the exchange
condition e(y) = 0. Then 8e−3y
2 − 1 = 0 and therefore y = √ln 2.
Consequently the switching strategy s(y), when observing Y = y, is
s(y) =


Switch, if y <
√
ln 2;
Indifferent, if y =
√
ln 2;
Do not switch, if y >
√
ln 2.
5.2.2 Strategy associated with the “halving and doubling” pro-
cess
Applying (4.9)
E(B
∣∣Y = y) = −y2fX1(y2) + yfX1(y) + 4yfX1(2y)
fX1(
y
2
) + 4fX1(y) + 4fX1(2y)
= y
32e−15y
2
+ 4e−3y
2 − 1
32e−15y2 + 16e−3y2 + 2
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Solving for y in the following exchange condition
e(y) = 32e−15y
2
+ 4e−3y
2 − 1 = 0.
Then
y ≈ 0.686511 = k.
Consequently, for the “halving or doubling” process, the switching strategy s(y), when
observing Y = y, is
s(y) =


Switch, if y < k;
Indifferent, if y = k;
Do not switch, if y > k
b(y)
y
0
0.68 0.83
Figure 5.1: Weibull: The expected benefit b(0.686511) ≈ 0 when the “halving or doubling”
strategy is adopted and b(
√
ln 2) = 0 when the “doubling-only” strategy is adopted.
In this example, it is noted that the benefit functions associated with the different content
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and allocation processes highlight the difference in strategies. However, both in Figure 5.1
indicate that the expected benefit becomes negative as the observed value increases and
that the agent should therefore not switch.
5.3 Broome’s approach
The following examples, that are described by Broome (1995:p7), are associated with a
“doubling-only” content and allocation process.
5.3.1 Discrete variable
fX1(x1) =
2n
3n+1
∀ x1 = 2n, n ∈ N0.
Applying (4.4)
E(B
∣∣Y = y) = −y2P (X1 = y2) + yP (X1 = y)
P (X1 =
y
2
) + P (X1 = y)
= y
2n − 2n−23
2n−13 + 2n
=
y
10
> 0.
And, consequently, it is beneficial to switch irrespective of the amount observed.
5.3.2 Continuous variable
fX1(x1) =
1
(x1 + 1)2
∀ x1 > 0.
Applying (4.7)
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E(B
∣∣Y = y) = −y2fX1(y2) + 2yfX1(y)
fX1(
y
2
) + 2fX1(y)
= y
(y + 2)2 − (y + 1)2
(y + 2)2 + 2(y + 1)2
=
2y2 + 3y
3y2 + 8y + 6
> 0.
Therefore, always switch irrespective of the amount observed.
5.4 Extreme values
The exchange condition that is proposed by Brams and Kilgour (1995:p28) is developed
on the “halving-only” process, since a prior distribution is defined for the larger amount
in this instance defined by X and consequently X ′1 = X/2.
While Brams and Kilgour (1995) do not distinguish between the initial amounts X1 and
X ′1 and the final amounts Y and Z it must be realised that Y = y is observed as a result
of two distinctly and independent events c = (x1; 0; 0) or c = (2x1; 0, 1).
5.4.1 Discrete variable
P (X1 = x1) = pk+1 ∀ x1 = 2km, k ∈ Z.
Applying (4.5) the expected benefit upon observing Y = y is
E(B
∣∣Y = y) = −y2P (X1 = y) + yP (X1 = 2y)
P (X1 = y) + P (X1 = 2y)
= m · 2k 2pk+2 − pk+1
2pk+2 + 2pk+1
.
The exchange condition is
e(y) = 2pk+2 − pk+1 ∀ y = m · 2k, k ∈ Z.
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And consequently the switching strategy will be
s(y) =


Switch, if e(y) > 0
Indifference, if e(y) = 0
Do no switch, if e(y) < 0.
5.4.2 Continuous variable
fX1(x1) =


0, if x1 < 1;
10−2k−1, if 10k ≤ x1 < 10k+1 ∀ k ∈ N0.
If the content of the allocated envelope is revealed to contain an amount 1/2 ≤ y < 1
then the agent can take it that such an instance could only have arisen as a result of
the host priming the first envelope with an amount 1 ≤ x1 < 2 and as a result of the
“halving-only” process the second envelope would be assigned an amount 1/2 ≤ x′1 < 1.
And it is this second envelope that yields the observed amount. No other events are
possible for this outcome. The probability of any event c = (x1, 0, 1) for all 1 ≤ x1 < 2,
with an associated P (c) = 10−1, implies that the agent should always switch.
The agent will now need to consider observing an amount from the interval 10k ≤ y <
10k+1 for all k ∈ N0. The agent will need to keep in mind that the amount observed
Y = y is possible only as a result of the activities of the host. It is these activities and
the resultant outcomes (events) dictate what is observed by the agent.
The agent will noting that, since the “halving-only” process is operating, consider three
possibilities.
Interval 1. 10k ≤ y < 2 · 10k
The agent considers observing an amount from the intervals 10k ≤ y < 2 · 10k for all
k ∈ N0.
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This can be realised for any event {c} = {x1, 0, 0} for all 10k ≤ X1 < 2 · 10k or for any
event {c} = {x1, 0, 1} for all 2 · 10k ≤ X1 < 4 · 10k. The probability of any of these events
is P ({c}) = 10−2k−1 for all k ∈ N0. Applying (4.8)
E(B
∣∣Y = y) = −yP (10k ≤ X1 < 2 · 10k) + 4yP (2 · 10k ≤ X1 < 4 · 10k)
2P (10k ≤ X1 < 2 · 10k) + 4P (2 · 10k ≤ X1 < 4 · 10k) .
Since, P (10k ≤ X1 < 2 · 10k) = P (2 · 10k ≤ X1 < 4 · 10k) for all k ∈ N0, then
=
−y + 4y
2 + 4
=
y
2
> 0 ∀k ∈ N0, 10k ≤ Y < 2 · 10k.
Interval 2. 10k+1/2 ≤ y < 10k+1
The agent considers observing an amount from the interval 10k+1/2 ≤ y < 10k+1.
This can be realised for any event {c} = {x1, 0, 0} ∀ 10k+1/2 ≤ X1 < 10k+1 with
an associated probability P ({c}) = 10−2k−1 for all k ∈ N0 or for any event {c} =
{x1, 0, 1} ∀ 10k+1 ≤ X1 < 10k+12 with an associated probability P ({c}) = 10−2(k+1)−1
for all k ∈ N0. Applying (4.8)
E(B
∣∣Y = y) = −yP (1210k+1 ≤ X1 < 10k+1) + 4yP (10k+1 ≤ X1 < 2 · 10k+1)
2P (1
2
10k+1 ≤ X1 < 10k+1) + 4P (10k+1 ≤ X1 < 2 · 10k+1)
=
−y10−2k−1 + 4y10−2(k+1)−1
210−2k−1 + 410−2(k+1)−1
= −y24
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< 0 ∀k ∈ N0, 1
2
10k+1 ≤ Y < 10k+1.
Interval 3. 10k2 ≤ y < 10k+1/2
And finally, the agent considers observing an amount from the interval 10k2 ≤ y <
10k+1/2.
For any event {c} = {x1, 0, 0} ∀ 10k2 ≤ X1 < 10k+1/2 with an associated probability
P ({c}) = 10−2k−1 for all k ∈ N0 or for any event {c} = (x1, 0, 1) ∀ 10k4 ≤ X1 < 10k+1
with an associated probability P ({c}) = 10−2k−1 for all k ∈ N0. Applying (4.8)
E(B
∣∣Y = y) = −yP (2 · 10k2 ≤ X1 < 1210k+1) + 4yP (4 · 10k ≤ X1 < 10k+1)
2P (2 · 10k ≤ X1 < 1210k+1) + 4P (4 · 10k ≤ X1 < 10k+1)
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Since, P (2 · 10k ≤ X1 < 1210k+1) = P (4 · 10k ≤ X1 < 10k+1) for all k ∈ N0, then
=
−y + 4y
2 + 4
=
y
2
> 0 ∀k ∈ N0, 10k2 ≤ Y < 1
2
10k+1.
We will now consider the instance where k ∈ N0. When the agent observes an amount
10k ≤ Y < 10k+1 then in the presence of the “halving-only” process, what is observed
in this interval is only possible if the amount assigned to the first envelope originated
from the interval 10k ≤ X1 < 10k+12. What must now be allowed for is the random
allocation of the envelopes. One, of which will reveal the content to be in the interval
10k ≤ Y < 10k+1.
If an amount 10k+1 ≤ X1 < 2 · 10k+1 is assigned to the first envelope, and as a result of
halving the amount 10k+1/2 ≤ X ′1 < 10k+1 is assigned to the second envelope. It is the
content of this second envelope that the agent will be sighting.
If an amount 10k+1/2 ≤ X1 < 10k+1 is assigned to the first envelope, and as a result of
halving the amount 10k+1/4 ≤ X ′1 < 10k+1/2 is assigned to the second envelope. It is the
content of the first envelope that the agent will be sighting.
Alternatively, if the first envelope is assigned an amount 10k ≤ X1 < 2 · 10k and the
second 10k/2 ≤ X ′1 < 10k.
And consequently, for all k ∈ N0 the agents strategy will be
s(y) =


Switch, if 1
2
≤ y < 1;
Switch, if 10k ≤ y < 2 · 10k;
Switch, if 2 · 10k ≤ Y < 1
2
10k+1;
Do not switch, if 1
2
10k+1 ≤ Y < 10k+1.
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5.5 Recurrence relation
Meacham and Weisberg (2003) questions the findings of Clark and Shackel (2000) and
propose the following distribution function associated with a discrete variable.
pn = P (X1 = 2
n) =
1
2
(pn−1 + 2
−2n) =
1
2
pn−1 + 2
−(2n+1) ∀ n ∈ N
and
P (X1 = 2
0) = p0 =
1
12
.
Consider
pk = P (X1 = 2
k) =
1
2
pk−1 + 2
−(2k+1)
and
pk+1 = P (X1 = 2
k+1) =
1
2
pk + 2
−(2k+3).
The “doubling-only” process will be adopted. Applying (4.4)
E(B
∣∣Y = 2k+1) = −2kP (X1 = 2k) + 2k+1P (X1 = 2k+1)
P (X1 = 2k) + P (X1 = 2k+1)
=
−2kpk + 2k+1pk+1
pk + pk+1
=
−2kpk + 2k+1(12pk + 2−(2k+3))
pk +
1
2
pk + 2−(2k+3)
=
2−(k+2)
3
2
pk + 2−(2k+3)
=
2−(k+1)
3pk + 2−2(k+1)
> 0 ∀ k ∈ N0.
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And consequently it is beneficial to switch irrespective of the amount observed.
5.6 Improper distribution
The mere idea of considering a distribution function that is not normalised would be
anathema to many of the authors. As had been documented, only normalised distribu-
tions are considered by many authors and used to explain the apparent paradox. At the
outset, to consider such distributions may seem unacceptable (Vazquez 2012:p11). How-
ever, the expected benefit conditional on the sub-σ-algebra generated by the observed
amount Y = y for a improper distributions are now considered.
5.6.1 Exponential
For illustrative purposes consider
fX1(x1) = 2
−4x2 ∀ x > 0.
Although this function possess similarities to the Weibull it is not normalised and there-
fore a constant k will be introduced to ensure that it satisfies the criteria of a probability
density function (cumulative distribution function).
The probability density function is therefore
fX1(x1) = k2
−4x2 ∀ x > 0.
A “doubling-only” process will be adopted, and since X1 is a continuous variable, then
applying (4.7)
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E(B
∣∣Y = y) = −y2fX1(y2) + 2yfX1(y)
fX1(
y
2
) + 2fX1(y)
=
−y
2
k2−y
2
+ 2yk2−4y
2
k2−y2 + 2k2−4y2
.
It will be noted that the normalising constant k is factored out and that the exchange
condition is
e(y) = −y
2
2−y
2
+ 2y2−4y
2
.
From which the strategy associated with the function is as follows:
s(y) =


Switch, if y <
√
2
3
;
Indifferent, if y =
√
2
3
;
Do not switch, if y >
√
2
3
.
And as expected, this function presents a similar switching strategy to that derived for
the Weibull distribution.
5.6.2 Jeffreys’ prior
The scale invariant “Jeffreys’ prior”
fX1(x1) ∝
1
x1
is proposed by Vazquez (2012:p7) and considered by Gill (2011:p9).
For illustrative purposes consider
fX1(x1) =
k
xn
∀ x > 0, n ∈ N.
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Although there may be protests from the purists, as before a constant k will be intro-
duced to ensure that it satisfies the criteria of a probability density function (cumulative
distribution function).
A “doubling-only” process will be adopted, and since X1 is a continuous variable, then
applying (4.7)
E(B
∣∣Y = y) = −y2fX1(y2) + 2yfX1(y)
fX1(
y
2
) + 2fX1(y)
= y
2− 2n−1
2 + 2n
.
It will be noted that the normalising constant k is factored out, as is y−n, and that the
exchange condition is
e(y) = 2− 2n−1.
From which the strategy associated with the function, irrespective of the observed amount,
is as follows:
s(y) =


Switch, if n = 1;
Indifferent, if n = 2;
Do not switch, if n > 2.
The very idea of an improper distribution may be preposterous to many purists (Scott
and Scott 1997:P39). While such distribution functions as noted by Vazquez (2012:p11)
may seem absurd, they are, nonetheless, as entertaining as the two-envelope problem and
should therefore be considered as legitimate.
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5.7 Summary
These examples are all legitimate distribution functions and their use to generate an
initial amount, although in question by some, do give rise to some interesting and diverse
switching strategies. All these strategies are conditional upon the sighting of the amount
in the allocated envelope. And essential to any one of the strategies is the content and
allocation process adopted by the host.
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Chapter 6
The question of a “paradox”
. . . thought is the weighing of relative likelihoods of possible events and the act
of sampling from the “posterior”, the probability distribution on unknown events,
given the sum total of our knowledge of past events and the present context. If this
is so, then the paradigmatic mental object is not a proposition, standing in all its
eternal glory with its truth value emblazoned on its chest, but the random variable
x, its value subject to probabilities but still not fixed . . .. The simplest example
where human thinking is clearly of this kind may well be the case where probabilities
can be made explicit: gambling. Here we are quite conscious that we are weighing
likelihoods (and even calculating them if we are mathematically inclined). If we
accept this, the division of mathematics corresponding to this realm of experience
is not logic but probability and statistics.
— The Dawning of the Age of Stochasticity (Mumford 1999:5)
The two-envelope paradox has generated much debate within academic circles from di-
verse disciplines such as mathematics, statistics, economics, philosophy, and psychology.
The perception of this research is that irrespective of which envelope is allocated to
the agent, it would always be beneficial for the agent to switch to the complementary
envelope.
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Although Smullyan (1992:191) dismisses the use of probability to explain the paradox,
he still uses the words: “probability”, “equal probability”, “chances”, “ . . . the chances of
gaining or losing are equal”, and “ . . . odds”. All these terms and expressions have prob-
abilistic connotations and, subsequently, what is considered to be devoid of probability
must be resolved by a embracing a probabilistic argument. Sutton (2010), by contrast,
argues that since the two-envelope problem is a decision theoretic, the agent may assume
— in the absence of sighting the content of the allocated envelope — that since the con-
tents are fixed at the time of selection, that they remain unchanged during the process
and, therefore, that it is irrelevant whether he or she chooses to switch or not. Whether
sighting the content provides any information to assist the agent in deciding to switch or
not is dependent on the information provided by the host of the game.
It is true that the content of one envelope is twice that of the other. It is also true
that relative to the content of the first envelope — if the halving or doubling process
was adopted by the host — the second envelope is either half or double that of the
first. However, based on what has been discussed in the previous chapters, this can be
considered to be only half the story. The allocation of either envelope to the agent is
reliant on the outcome of a random event, and in this instance, there are two possibilities:
either the event (x1;ω2; 0) or the event (x1;ω2; 1) has been realised by the host. These
events may not have occurred with equal likelihood as revealed in Chapter 4.
6.1 A likely outcome
“Probability is now irrelevant,” said the Sorcerer.
— Satan, Cantor, and Infinity (Smullyan 1992:191)
Not so! We say that the outcome of a toss of an unbiased coin is either a head or a tail.
It is also said that the content of the other envelope is either 2n or n/2. As stated by
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Mumford (1999) such events are best described in the terms of probability.
Before explaining the reasoning behind the apparent paradox, it is necessary to introduce
some notation. Where possible, all arguments are expressed in terms of the realisations
of the experiments performed by the host; consequently, random variables are only used
when necessary in order to align with the thinking of Smullyan and to argue in favour of
probability.
The amount assigned to the second envelope is dependent upon the outcome of an ex-
periment performed by the host. The factor g(ω2) is derived from the outcome of tossing
an unbiased coin:
g(ω2) =
1
2
(1− ω2) + 2ω2 =


1
2
, if ω2 = 0;
2, if ω2 = 1.
The random selection of one of the primed (indistinguishable) envelopes and the allocation
of that envelope to the agent is represented by the symmetric matrix A(ω3).
A(ω3) =

1− ω3 ω3
ω3 1− ω3

 =


I, if ω3 = 0;
J, if ω3 = 1.
where I and J are the identity and exchange matrices, respectively.
For the outcomes of the experiments performed by the host, namely c = (x1;ω2; 0) —
allocate the first envelope — and c = (x1;ω2; 1) — allocate the second envelope, the
allocated and complementary envelope contents are as follows:
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C(c) = C(x1;ω2;ω3) (6.1)
= x1
[
1 g(ω2)
]
A(ω3)
=


x1
[
1 g(ω2)
]
, if ω3 = 0;
x1
[
g(ω2) 1
]
, if ω3 = 1.
(6.2)
Therefore, the benefit of switching, given the event (x1;ω2;ω3), is
b(x1;ω2;ω3) =


x1(g(ω2)− 1), if ω3 = 0;
x1(1− g(ω2), if ω3 = 1.
(6.3)
6.2 The Story
There are two sealed envelopes on the table. You are told that one of them contains
twice as much money as the other. You pick one of them and open it to see how
much money is inside. Let’s say you find $100 in it. Then you are given the option
of keeping it or trading it for the other envelope. Now, the other envelope has twice
as much or half as much with equal probability. Thus, the chances are equal that
the other envelope has $200 or $50, and the chances of your gaining or losing are
equal. And so the odds are in your favour if you trade.
— Satan, Cantor, and Infinity (Smullyan 1992:189)
As mentioned in the literary review the importance of posing the two-envelope problem
in a form that supports a probabilistic argument is pivotal for the derivation of a switch-
ing strategy. The propositions presented by Smullyan (1992:190) are repeated here for
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convenience:
Proposition 1. The amount that you will gain, if you do gain, is greater than the amount
you will lose, if you do lose.
Proposition 2. The amounts are the same.
For the event (x1;ω2; 0), the agent would be allocated the envelope containing the amount
x1, while the complementary envelope would contain the amount x1g(ω2). Consequently,
if the agent were to switch envelopes, the benefit would be x1(g(ω2) − 1). The agent
should argue similarly for the event (x1;ω2; 1).
It is clear from Equation 6.3, in the absence of any information, that b(x1;ω2; 0) =
−b(x1;ω2; 1) supports Proposition 2. In the words of Smullyan (1992:191): “If you gain
on the trade, you gain d dollars, and if you lose on the trade, you lose d dollars. And so
the amounts are the same after all”.
This is akin to the agent having no information about the game and consequently includes
the instance where the agent is not afforded the opportunity of sighting the content of
the allocated envelope before deciding to switch envelopes or not.
6.3 Half the story
Smullyan (1992:p190) has in Proposition 2 chosen to present the equally likely events
(x1;ω2; 0) and (x1;ω2; 1) and then demonstrates the outcome by way of an example that
the benefits of trading amounts are the same.
Suppose, however that the host identifies an amount x1 and after assigning this amount
to the first envelope immediately allocates the envelope to the agent. The host then iden-
tifies a subsequent amount x1g(ω2) and then assigns this to the second (complementary)
envelope.
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The only possible event representing the outcome in this instance is (x1;ω2; 0), which
reflects the allocation to the agent of the envelope that contains x1. The complementary
envelope will then contain x1g(ω2), which can take the value x1/2 or 2x1, depending
on ω2. The “halving or doubling” process is in operation here, since a “doubling-only”
process would result in 2x1 only and consequently there is no gamble. In other words,
the agent knows for certain that the complementary envelope contains twice the amount
of the allocated envelope, and therefore a “doubling-only” process is not possible.
For the event c = (x1;ω2; 0), x1 is allocated to the agent, while the amount in the
complementary envelope could be either x1/2 or 2x1 with an equal likelihood. Hence, if
the agent were to switch, he or she would gain x1 or lose x1/2. This is the reasoning
behind Proposition 1. It can be argued that a rational agent would switch envelopes if
the certain amount x1 was considered against the pay-off associated with a bet on either
x1/2 or 2x1 (Cargile 1992: p. 212, 216).
A risk-neutral and rational agent should argue that for any gamble that the average payoff
of the complementary envelope being greater than the allocated envelope supports the
decision to trade. However, in this way no consideration has been paid to the content
and allocation process, or more specifically the random selection and allocation of the
envelopes. However, to trade and then resort to the same argument is fallacious, since the
resultant envelopes amounts to the realisation of the event (x1;ω2; 1), and the observed
content of the second envelope is now not the amount x1g(ω2), which is a nebulous
amount, but either x1/2 or 2x1. Neither of these amounts can be observed simultaneously.
Thus, had the agent observed x1/2, he or she would infer that the complementary envelope
contained either x1/4 or x1. In the absence of information, whether having sight of the
contents or not, the agent should be indifferent to switching envelopes or not. The benefit
of switching, given the event (x1;ω2; 0), is therefore
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b(x1;ω2; 0) = x1(g(ω2)− 1) =


−1
2
x1, if ω2 = 0;
x1, if ω2 = 1.
(6.4)
and since these outcomes are equally likely, the agent should switch envelopes.
6.4 The full story
Smullyan (1992) allows for the events (x1;ω2; 0) and (x1;ω2; 1) when discussing Proposi-
tion 2, but only the event (x1;ω2; 0) when discussing Proposition 1. Ignoring the event
(x1;ω2; 1) when discussing Proposition 1 amounts to dismissing the random allocation
of the envelopes and, consequently, the problem becomes a gamble for which the payoff
is the difference between the expected content of the complementary envelope and the
sighted content of the allocated envelope.
Possibility 4 and Possibility 5 Before the agent is afforded the opportunity of sighting the
content of the allocated envelopes, he or she should consider that the events (x1;ω2; 0)
and (x1;ω2; 1) are equally likely. For the event (x1;ω2; 0), the agent is allocated the
envelope that contains x1 and the complementary envelope therefore contains either x1/2
or 2x1 with an equal probability. The agent can, in this instance, after sighting the
content (Clark and Shackel 2000:428), correctly argue that the complementary envelope
contains either half or double the content of allocated envelope. Unfortunately, the same
reasoning cannot be applied to the event (x1;ω2; 1). In this instance, the content of the
allocated envelope will be either x1/2 or 2x1 and the complementary envelope will contain
x1. Upon sighting the content of the allocated envelope, if it were x1/2 the agent would
erroneously reason that the content of the complementary envelope would be either x1/4
or x1, of which only x1 is possible. Similarly, if the agent were to sight the amount 2x1,
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then using the same reasoning he or she would expect the complementary envelope to
contain either x1 or 4x1, of which only x1 is correct.
The switching decision is not dependent on the expected content of the allocated envelope
but rather on the sighted content of the allocated envelope and the expected content of
the complementary envelope. It is therefore necessary for the agent — upon sighting the
content — to apply one of the strategies discussed in Chapter 4.
Moreover, the consideration by Chase (2002:158) of equally likely events (x1;ω2; 0) and
(x1;ω2; 1) is necessary when comparing Proposition 1 with Proposition 2.
6.5 Summary
There is an ample supply of misleading leads, false clues, and dead ends to confuse
the issue . . . you will be dealing with concepts that are central to a number of
philosophical doctrines or controversies. Not only are the fundamental notions of
decision theory involved, — preferences, desirability, probability, possibility, and
expected utility — but one also finds the slightly suspect Kripkean idea of fixing
the reference of a name by means of a description.
— The Mystery of Julius: A Paradox in Decision Theory (Chihara 1995:5)
The introduction of the concept of a probability triple (Ω,F, P ) and the defined sample
space follows the approach put forward by Christensen and Utts (1992), who explore the
paradox from a frequentist perspective. In their proposal, they adopt only the doubling
strategy. Bruss (1996) acknowledges that the paradox is a fallacy associated with the
failure to define the appropriate sample space. He concurs with Christensen and Utts
(1992) in their frequentist and Bayesian explanation.
It is not correct to argue that the complementary envelope Z contains y/2 or 2y in the
absence of the stated information. The events that originate from the activities of the
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host are essential for the agent to know. In the absence of this information, sighting
the content or not has no bearing on the expected outcome and, consequently, the agent
should be indifferent about switching or not.
A fundamental principle for the resolution of any problem is its re-formulation into a
format that lends itself readily to the application of methods that may realise an outcome
that was not initially obvious. In the absence of such an initiative, academic sleight-of-
hand has gone unnoticed. There has thus been the realisation that there is more to this
simple problem than meets the eye.
The random variable Y , which represents the content of the allocated envelope according
to current and previous thinking, will always have the value Y = y and should be treated
as fixed.
Smullyan (1992) attempts to explain the paradox using logic; however in Proposition 1 he
fails to consider that he was not considering the benefit as he described in Proposition 2
and, therefore, that any comparison would be impossible. However, had he considered
expressing Proposition 1 as expressed herein, he would have realised that Proposition 1
and Proposition 2 actually agree.
There are two possibilities. The agent is allocated the first envelope containing the initial
amount X1 = x1 and the second envelope is then assigned the amount X
′
1 = x1/2 or the
agent is allocated the first envelope containing the initial amount X1 = x1 and the second
envelope is then assigned the amount X ′1 = 2x1.
Whether sighting the content or not, in the absence of all other information, Proposition 2
is true. In sighting the content of the allocated envelope, Proposition 1 is not true since
only the certain outcome of a specific event is considered.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
Today’s scientists have substituted mathematics for experiments, and they wander
off through equation after equation, and eventually build a structure which has no
relation to reality.
— Nikola Tesla
Does the two-envelope paradox exist? This question, which has entertained, challenged,
and frustrated many researchers, has received much attention since the original formula-
tion by Kraitchik (1942:p133). In all its variants, however, it remains essentially the same,
and therefore the overriding question remains: Is there a benefit to switching? While a
number of approaches have proposed to resolve this dilemma, the approach adopted in
this paper has revealed a missing piece of the puzzle.
The apparent two-envelope paradox exists only when the problem is formulated from an
incomplete or inadequate description of the realisable benefits and when there is complete
disregard for some of the fundamental and essential issues associated with probability.
For example, Norton (1998) formulates elaborate solutions to a simple problem, and
then ignores the fundamental concepts essential for any mathematically derived solution.
In conclusion, provided there is no knowledge of the distribution function from which
the monetary amounts were drawn or the limits of the monetary content in each of the
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envelopes, and irrespective of whether the content of the chosen envelope is sighted or
not, there is no benefit to the agent of switching.
This thesis has demonstrated that the benefit of switching therefore does not rely upon
a single event but rather upon the statistical expectation associated with the activities
of the host for the sighted content of the allocated envelope. Because the posing of
the problem is set in probabilistic formalism, it lends itself readily to statistical and
probabilistic resolution methods. The activities of the host, when revealed to the agent,
are sufficient for the agent to derive an envelope-switching strategy. In the absence of
this information, the agent should be indifferent to switching.
Much of what is purported to resolve the problem (and thereby the paradox) results
from poor formulation and incorrect structuring as well as from the outright ignorance
of fundamental statistical methods. Oftentimes, the problem is contextualised in unnec-
essary jargon and complex mathematical methods. The paradox that has long possessed
academics has no legitimacy, and only exists for those that choose it to. Indeed, the sub-
stantiation of the paradox stems from the flawed interpretation of an ill-posed problem
and an abuse of basic statistical methods.
The examples, where sighting the content of the allocated envelope, have revealed that
in some instances it is always beneficial to switch. There are instances where it is not
beneficial to switch and there are others where the strategy is mixed. In all instances
the expected benefit is conditional on the sub-σ-algebra induced by the observed amount
represented by the random variable Y , irrespective if the observed amount is a probability
zero event. Arguments questioning the relevance of distributions or functions over infinite
amounts are no longer valid. Distribution or functions that represent infinite amounts
are legitimate and in the presence of the necessary information it will be realised that
the approach derived in this paper, that exploits the features of the sub-σ-algebra, can
yield an appropriate switching strategy. As noted by Meacham and Weisberg (2003:p4)
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switching envelopes is conditional upon the sighting of a particular value, in the allocated
envelope, and not whether swapping is better “on average” over repeated trials. In in-
stances where the “exchange condition” is positive for all observed amounts, implying that
it is not necessary to view the contents and that it would make sense to switch envelopes
irrespective of sighting the content or not does not legitimise the paradox (Brams and
Kilgour 1995:p28).
7.1 In closing
. . . statistical information on frequencies within a large, repetitive class of events is
strictly irrelevant to a decision whose outcome depends on a single trial.
— Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms (Ellsberg 1961:2)
In the “halving or doubling” process the traditional argument is to assess the benefit
of switching the allocated envelope for the complementary envelope. The content of
one of the envelopes, for this process, is acknowledged to be either half or double the
other. With this information the agent is assumed to reason that there are two amounts
for consideration and that the conditional probability of these amounts are all that are
necessary to derived the expected benefit. But, as has been demonstrated the conditional
expectation for this content and allocation process is dependent on the host sampling
three distinct amounts. These possible initial amounts are all induced by the amount
observed by the agent.
For any play of the game the agent may lose or the agent may win. Alternatively, if the
agent is mathematically inclined, he or she may apply likelihoods to each of the induced
outcomes and derive an expected benefit of switching envelopes.
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7.2 The paradox . . .
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This is your last chance. After this, there is no turning back. You take the blue
pill – the story ends, you wake up in your bed and believe whatever you want to
believe. You take the red pill – you stay in Wonderland, and I show you how deep
the rabbit hole goes.
— Morpheus (The Matrix)
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